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RELATIONAL TAX PLANNING UNDER RISK-BASED RULES
ALEX RASKOLNIKOVt
Risk-based rules are the tax system's primary response to aggressive tax
planning. They usually grant benefits only to those taxpayers who accept risk
of changes in market prices (market risk) or business opportunities (business
risk). Attempts to circumvent these rules by hedging, contractual safeguards,
and diversification are well understood. The same cannot be said about a very
different type of tax planning. Instead of reducing risk directly, some taxpayers
change the nature of risk. They enter into informal, legally unenforceable
agreements with contractual counterparties that are designed to eliminate mar-
ket or business risk entirely. The new uncertainty these tax planners inevitably
accept, however, is the risk that the counterparties will violate the implicit
agreements and betray taxpayers' trust (counterparty risk). A deliberate sub-
stitution of counterparty risk for market or business risk is what this Article
calls relational tax planning. The Article offers an economic analysis of dif-
ferent risks and considers two responses to the relational tax planning problem.
The analysis suggests that from a welfarist perspective, business risk is a supe-
rior deterrent compared to both market and counterparty risks. Counterparty
risk is the most complex of the three. In addition to producing risk-bearing
losses like all other risks, it leads to reduced transaction costs in future ex-
changes between relational tax planners, but only if they manage to overcome
bargaining obstacles caused by opportunism and asymmetric information.
These insights suggest two very different responses. A sweeping reform will al-
low-and even encourage-taxpayers to engage in relational tax planning,
but it will also ensure that counterparty risk they incur is sufficiently high. If
only incremental improvements are pursued, courts should increase their scru-
tiny of relational tax planning involving extensive dyadic business relation-
ships and interactions based on social norms.
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INTRODUCTION
Contrary to popular belief, death and taxes have little in common.
While death is indeed certain, taxpayers have plenty of ways to escape
(some of) their tax obligations. But they must pay a price: work less
than they would have liked, save less than they would have preferred,
or do a number of other things they would rather not do. This Article
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is about one unpleasant consequence that taxpayers must often accept
as a price of lowering their tax bills-risk.
Tax law is full of risk-based rules-provisions that grant tax bene-
fits only to those who accept a certain amount of risk.' Yet courts and
scholars have failed to recognize that not all risks are the same. As a
result, the government's efforts to protect the tax base by relying on
risk-based rules have been even less successful than is commonly ac-
knowledged.
The multitude of risk-based rules that pervade all areas of tax law
are deceptively similar. They all appear to bestow benefits only on
those who accept risk of changes in market prices (market risk) or
business opportunities (business risk). Because many taxpayers dislike
risk, random market forces deter them from engaging in undesirable
tax planning-or so the government hopes. Virtually all commentary
regarding risk-based rules has focused on market risk.'
Yet taxpayers often face a very different kind of uncertainty. They
attempt to reduce their taxes by relying on assistance from contractual
partners without obtaining a legally enforceable right to compel these
partners to act as the parties agreed. These tax planners assume the
risk that their counterparties will not perform as promised (counter-
party risk). Factors affecting this type of uncertainty-such as asym-
metric information and opportunistic behavior-are fundamentally
different from those that underlie market and business risks.
Taxpayers' efforts to engage in what I call traditional tax plan-
ning-reducing market and business risks by hedging, contractual
safeguards, and diversification-have drawn plenty of interest from poli-
cymakers and academics alike. At the same time, taxpayers have
learned to substitute counterparty risk for market and business risks
and engage in what I refer to as relational tax planning without too much
unwanted attention. The disparity is understandable. Traditional tax
planning is often easy to define and detect because it involves reliance
I Daniel Shaviro defined risk-based rules as "rules that give the presence or ab-
sence of elements of economic risk a tax significance that is distinct from any effect
that such risk has on fair market value or the accrual of economic gain or loss." Daniel
Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 643
(1995) [hereinafter Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules].
2 See, e.g., Robert H. Scarborough, Risk, Diversication and the Design of Loss Limita-
tions Under a Realization-Based Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 677, 679-81 (1993); Deborah
H. Schenk, Taxation of Equity Derivatives: A Partial Integration Proposal, 50 TA L. REV.
571, 583-87 (1995); Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, supra note 1, at 645-50; Alvin C. Warren,
Jr., Commentary, Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Polity, 107 HARV. L. REV.
460, 460-61 (1993).
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on express, written contracts. These contracts may be long, complex,
and seemingly unrelated to transactions that give rise to the underlying
risk, but often they are clear, readily observable, and verifiable. In con-
trast, relational tax planning is much harder for the government to
counter. It depends on tacit understandings and implicit agreements
that are difficult to define, identify, and prove in court.
For example, a risk-based wash sale rule attempts to foreclose tax-
motivated loss harvesting by denying a deduction to taxpayers who sell
securities at a loss and repurchase identical securities within thirty
3days. Tax planners may try to circumvent this rule by selling the se-
curity and immediately buying a thirty-one-day option to purchase an
identical security for the same price.4 Discovering this option is not
particularly challenging for the government, nor is deciding whether
the waiting period should be suspended if such option is acquired.'
But what if instead of buying an option, the taxpayer sells the security
to a friend or a business associate, with an understanding (unwritten
and unenforceable) that the taxpayer will repurchase the security for
the same price in just over a month? Administering a system that
takes informal arrangements like this into account is much more diffi-
cult. It is hardly surprising that the government has not had much
success in combating relational planning. Commentators have done
little to assist policymakers in developing alternative approaches.
This Article reverses the trend. It highlights the challenge of rela-
tional tax planning, offers an economic analysis of market, business,
and counterparty risks, and evaluates two alternative reforms. The
three risks differ in their deterrent effects and social welfare conse-
quences. Business risk is a particularly attractive policy instrument.
Tax planners who accept it not only incur a risk-bearing loss (a private
and social cost similar for all risks), but also sustain an expected loss
from resolution of future business contingencies (a private cost that
has no effect on the overall social welfare). The latter feature makes
business risk a more efficient deterrent than market risk.
3 The wash sale rule, as well as all other rules and judicial doctrines mentioned in
this Article, is more complicated than the discussion suggests. For a detailed analysis
of the intricacies of the wash sale provision, see, for example, David M. Schizer, Scrub-
bing the Wash Sale Rules, TAXES, Mar. 2004, at 67 [hereinafter Schizer, Wash Sale Rules].
4 In fact, many did.
5 It is. I.R.C. § 1091 (a) (2000).
6 For an effort to offer one such approach to a particular type of relational tax
planning, see Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74
U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 665-77 (2007) [hereinafter Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms].
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The two unique characteristics of counterparty risk are the coopera-
tion gain and the bargaining cost. The cooperation gain exists because,
by relying on contractual partners, taxpayers and their counterparties
build (or reinforce) mutual trust. Stronger trust reduces transaction
costs, not just in the tax-motivated exchange that produced it, but in
all other interactions between the two transactors as well. This is
clearly beneficial to relational tax planners. Whether society benefits
as well is a much more difficult question. The bargaining cost arises
because relational tax planning requires cooperation. Contract schol-
ars and organizational theorists learned long ago that whenever bar-
gaining is required, people occasionally fail to capture available gains
from trade.7 Opportunistic behavior and asymmetric information get
in the way. While bargaining failures of commercial actors generally
reduce social welfare (valuable goods and services are underpro-
duced), no such reduction occurs when contracting is tax motivated
(fewer tax shelters go forward). Therefore, the bargaining cost acts as
an additional deterrent without increasing the social cost of counter-
party risk.
These insights allow us to evaluate two responses to the relational
tax planning problem: a sweeping reform and a set of incremental
improvements. The former alternative is a complete reversal of the
current approach. Rather than designing risk-based rules with market
risk in mind and then struggling to protect them from taxpayers' at-
tempts to switch to counterparty risk, the government may deliber-
ately allow taxpayers to make the substitution. The key point is that
this concession will produce no windfall to relational tax planners as
long as the amount of risk they must incur to obtain the desired tax
benefits is sufficiently high, assuming the market-risk-to-counterparty-
risk conversion. Continuing with the wash sale example, if a thirty-day
waiting period is too short, assuming the wash seller has an informal
arrangement to repurchase the security, a longer waiting period may
restore the balance. Whether it will take two months, three months,
or even longer, at some point the private cost of a possible counter-
party defection may become roughly as great as the private cost of in-
curring market risk produced by the current thirty-day waiting period.
This approach has two clear advantages. First, once the extended
waiting period is chosen, the government no longer needs to continue
its (largely unsuccessful) efforts to weed out tacit understandings. En-
forcement costs are significantly reduced. Second, more taxpayers
7 See, e.g., sources cited infra notes 74-75.
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start to cooperate with each other. This increases both the coopera-
tion gain and the bargaining cost. Because the latter is a direct cost
present in any negotiation while the former is a second-order future
benefit available only to some relational tax planners, the net result is
likely to be a larger (private, but not social) cost. If so, counterparty
risk becomes a more attractive policy instrument than market risk, just
like business risk is today. Yet the alternative regime comes with con-
siderable drawbacks. It imposes new losses on taxpayers who engage
in no tax planning at all. It overdeters uncooperative tax planners.
Taxpayers will surely try to circumvent the new regime, and it is un-
certain how much success they are likely to have.
Incremental improvements to the existing risk-based rules are a less
ambitious solution. In sum, the current judicial doctrines that function
as risk-based rules are insufficiently nuanced. Business risk of the same
magnitude as a given market risk is a stronger deterrent, so courts
should be relatively more lenient in business risk cases. Counterparty
risk is most costly for business transactors engaged in single-shot deals.
Extensive commercial relationships reduce losses from incurring this
risk. And environments where parties interact based on mutually
shared informal understandings commonly referred to as social norms
are even more conducive to relational tax planning. Courts should take
these differences into account and scrutinize transactions in the last two
categories even more than they do today.
Part I briefly explains the importance of improving risk-based
rules. Part II distinguishes between market, business, and counter-
party risks. Part III defines and discusses relational tax planning, ar-
guing that it renders risk-based rules particularly ineffective. Part IV
evaluates the deterrent effects and social welfare implications of vari-
ous risks. Part V considers a dramatic reform-and Part VI suggests a
set of incremental improvements-that present policymakers with very
different solutions to the problem of relational tax planning under
risk-based rules.
I. WHY BOTHER WITH IMPROVING RISK-BASED RULES?
Before delving into a detailed analysis of risk-based rules, one
must address an immediate objection: these rules do not work; why
bother with improving them?
Take the wash sale rule as an example. It disallows a deduction
from selling a security at a loss (the loss security) unless the seller waits
for thirty days before repurchasing an identical one. What is the point
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of forcing taxpayers to wait? The real problem is tax-motivated sales,
whether or not followed by repurchases. These sales are inefficient
because the selling taxpayers change their behavior solely to improve
their tax positions. They are worse off, and no revenue is collected.
The standard deadweight loss of tax planning is the result.8 However,
discerning and proving taxpayers' intent or motive is costly. A bright-
line rule imposing a waiting period is much easier to administer. And
its effect, it is hoped, will often be the same as that of a cumbersome
intent-based inquiry. Tax-motivated sales will diminish because tax
planners will be reluctant to accept a risk that the loss security will ap-
preciate during the waiting period and they will have to pay more to
repurchase it than they received from its sale. At the same time, "real"
(not tax-motivated) transactions will continue unaffected because tax-
payers who want to get rid of the loss security for good will care little
about its possible appreciation during the next thirty days. What a
nice solution! No wonder the tax law is full of risk-based rules.
Yet these rules have been subjected to a devastating-and justifi-
able-criticism. 9 Forcing taxpayers to bear risk has no connection to
income measurement or any other fundamental goal of our tax sys-
tem. It is just a friction-a cost imposed on taxpayers to prevent them
from escaping tax, primarily on capital income. '° And as far as fric-
tions go, risk is not a particularly effective one." It typically functions
as a weak, continuous friction that can be avoided by a minor adjust-
ment in behavior. 12 Imposing this type of friction does little to reduce
elasticity of taxable income and, therefore, is likely to be rather ineffi-
cient.' 3 Daniel Shaviro drove the point home by arguing (only half-
a See, e.g., HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 283-305 (7th ed. 2005).
9 See Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, supra note 1; Lewis R. Steinberg, Commentary, 50 TAX
L. REv. 725 (1995).
0 Frictions are "transaction costs incurred in the marketplace that make imple-
mentation of certain tax-planning strategies costly." MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES
AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 9 (3d ed. 2005). The view of risk-
based rules as pure frictions is not uniformly accepted. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Fric-
tions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1360 (2001) [hereinaf-
ter Schizer, Fh'ctions].
11 See Schizer, Frictions, supra note 10, at 1325-26.
12 Id.
13 See David A. Weisbach, An Economic Analysis of Anti-Tax-Avoidance Doctrines, 4 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 88, 99-103 (2002) (arguing that the sham transaction doctrine is a
weak deterrent because it fails to stop numerous shelters and, therefore, has little ef-
fect on taxable income elasticity). Admittedly, not all risk-based rules give rise to con-
tinuous frictions. Yet, as David Schizer explains, the government often stumbles into
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jokingly) that if forcing taxpayers to do twenty back-somersaults on
April Fool's Day would allow the government to collect the necessary
revenue while creating fewer distortions and imposing smaller costs
than the current system does, we should go with the somersaults.
14
To make things worse, the government cannot assume that risk-
based rules actually result in the imposition of a meaningful risk.
That these rules fail to deter most tax planning involving financial as-
sets is hardly a matter for debate. 15 Provisions that apply to tangible
assets are also suspect.16 Even more disheartening is the near consen-
sus that little, if anything, can be done to improve risk-based rules or
devise alternative approaches that would assure adequate taxation of
capital income. 7 And if things are that bad, why bother with taxing
capital income at all? Why not just switch to a consumption tax andS 18
leave the nightmare of risk-based rules far behind?
Several reasons come to mind. First, a consumption tax, it turns
out, is no panacea. As soon as David Weisbach subjected the Flat
effective discontinuous frictions simply by accident. See Schizer, Frictions, supra note 10,
at 1371-74.
14 Daniel N. Shaviro, Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq
Case, 88 TAx NOTES 221, 223 (2000) [hereinafter Shaviro, Tax Shelters].
15 Traditional tax law's distinctions between ownership and use, debt and equity,
and fixed and contingent returns have proved to be no match to those who have con-
quered the power of the put-call parity theorem. See Warren, supra note 2, at 465-67;
see also Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products: Financial Innovation's Newest
Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1319, 1327-30 (1991); Schenk, supra note 2,
at 574-79; Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, supra note 1, at 651-56; Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Fi-
nancial Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569, 569-74 (1994); Warren,
supra note 2, at 482-91; David A. Weisbach, Tax Responses to Financial Contract Innova-
tion, 50 TAX L. REv. 491, 496-507 (1995). But see Mark P. Gergen, Afterword, Apocalypse
Not?, 50 TAX L. REV. 833 (1995).
16 At least in one commentator's view, they produce nonoptimal risk allocations,
misdirect resources, and generally amount to not much more than a "tax planning
nuisance." Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, supra note 1, at 695.
17 See id. at 723-24; Strnad, supra note 15, at 604-05. In the words of one observer,
Congress's repeated attempts to "'solve' the problem of financial asset taxation... has
done little to stop the proliferation of tax-motivated financial transactions, while sub-
jecting (at least part of) the tax law to mind-numbing complexity." Steinberg, supra
note 9, at 729; see also Joseph Bankman, Commentary, 50 TAX L. REV. 787, 787 (1995)
("The income tax treatment of capital is a mess.").
18 See Bankman, supra note 17, at 792 (concluding that while David Bradford's pro-
posed reform of income tax is an improvement over the current system based on risk-
based rules, it is still less efficient than a consumption tax); Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules,
supra note 1, at 723-24 ("[T]he increasing difficulty of reaching capital under an in-
come tax, by reason of the declining effectiveness of deterring tax planning through
risk-based rules, strengthens the case for shifting to consumption taxation.");
Steinberg, supra note 9, at 729 & n.20.
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Tax-a specific (and relatively politically viable) consumption tax
proposal-to moderate scrutiny, he found that it is vulnerable to the
same tensions that gave rise to the existing risk-based rules.' 9 To be
sure, some of the Flat Tax weaknesses are due to its unique features,
and some arise because of transition issues. 20 But several difficult line-
drawing problems plaguing today's income tax remain important in
any consumption tax regime. 2 1 While risk-based rules may well be less
central in some such regimes than they are in an income tax system, a
switch to a consumption tax will not free us from the need to rely on
these rules.
Nor is a wholesale switch to a consumption tax likely. While the
Flat Tax and other consumption tax proposals continue to be dis-
22cussed by academics and politicians, there appears to be no real ef-
19 See David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 616 (2000)
[hereinafter Weisbach, Flat Tax]. The troubling distinctions between owners and non-
owners, debt and equity holders, and time-value and risky returns remain important. See
id. at 615, 628-29, 635. Even the transactional patterns are eerily familiar: a sale and re-
purchase, see id. at 615, 628-29, 660-61, a sale and leaseback, see id. at 628 n.41, 660-61, a
straddle, see id. at 616, and, more generally, an arbitrage based on different tax treatment
of similar cash flows, see id. at 625, 628-29. In what must come as a shock to those who
hoped that a switch to a consumption tax would end the struggles with taxation of finan-
cial instruments once and for all, Weisbach concludes that "[t] he financial products rules
under an income tax probably have greater potential to be coherent than those under
the Flat Tax." Id. at 663. By referring to Professor Weisbach's scrutiny as "moderate," I in
no way mean to undermine the rigor of his analysis or the value of his contribution, both
of which are high. Rather, as Weisbach himself pointed out, his incentives to find loop-
holes in the Flat Tax were not nearly as strong as those incentives would be when the
brightest minds of the American tax bar set out on a search for weaknesses in the new
regime with hundreds of millions of dollars on the line. Id. at 629.
20 See id. at 660-61. For instance, tax planning using forward straddles is possible
because the Flat Tax is open and ignores financial transactions. Id. at 616. Similarly,
mischaracterization of interest is much less of a concern in closed regimes like the
European VATs. Id. at 629. Professor Shaviro anticipated these types of difficulties
and advocated a consumption tax that makes "the form of one's asset transactions as
irrelevant as possible-a consideration that may prove in some tension with transi-
tional relief or proposals that use a graduated rate structure." Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules,
supra note 1, at 724.
21 Ownership is one example. See Weisbach, Flat Tax, supra note 19, at 615 (ex-
plaining why personal versus business ownership of assets is important both in a closed
cash-flow consumption tax and an open system that, like the Flat Tax, combines a cash-
flow tax with a yield-exempt tax). The distinction between financial and other returns
is another. See id. at 627-28 (noting that tax planning based on overstating the interest
component of purchase price is possible in open and closed systems).
' For an academic discussion, see, for example, DAVID F. BRADFORD, FUNDAMEN-
TAL ISSUES IN CONSUMPTION TAXATION (1996), proposing the "X-Tax," and David A.
Weisbach, Does the X-Tax Mark the Spot?, 56 SMU L. REV. 201 (2003), which discusses
Bradford's proposal. For continuing political debates, see, for example, Heidi Glenn,
20081 1189
1190 UNIVERSITYOFPENSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:1181
fort to bring about an actual reform. European experience suggests
that even if Congress enacts a consumption tax (such as a VAT), the
new tax is likely to supplement rather than supplant the existing in-
23
come tax.
Moreover, a withering scholarly critique of risk-based rules ap-
pears to make little impression on courts and policymakers. Congress
continues to add these rules to the Internal Revenue Code.24  The
fundamental tax common law doctrines (many of which are risk-based
rules) remain in active use.25 The reason for this continuing reliance
is no mystery. While devising and applying risk-based rules surely
places informational demands on policymakers and judges, these de-
mands increase manyfold once some more effective frictions are con-
26
sidered. It is hardly surprising that decision makers routinely forgo
"Cleanse the Code" Reform Effort Attracts Strange Bedfellows, 113 TAX NOTES 949 (2006),
describing statements by various politicians and lobbying groups favoring different ver-
sions of a consumption tax.
23 SeeJOEL SLEMROD &JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE
DEBATE OVER TAXES 15 (3d ed. 2004) ("By 1999, all OECD nations except the United
States had adopted VATs, which on average raised 6.4 percent of GDP."). For a similar
proposal in the U.S. context, see Michael J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A
Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261, 281-99 (2002).
24 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 901(k) (2000) (added in 1997); I.R.C. § 901 (l) (Supp. LV 2004)
(added in 2004); I.R.C. § 1259 (2000) (added in 1997); id. § 1260 (added in 1999).
25 For recent cases relying on the economic substance doctrine, see, for example,
Coltec Industries v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) and Black & Decker v.
United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006). The point that the economic substance
doctrine is a risk-based rule is not new. See Shaviro, Tax Shelters, supra note 14, at 222.
26 Granted, the magnitude of risk produced by a 30-day waiting period is uncertain,
and it differs depending on the volatility of the security in question. Similarly, the con-
structive sale rule that accelerates a taxable gain for taxpayers who eliminate "substan-
tially all" of their economic exposure to an appreciated stock produces considerable am-
biguity. Still, policymakers probably have a rough sense of the amount of risk involved.
A 30-day waiting period is surely less risky than a 90-day one. Compare I.RC. § 1091(a)
(2000) (thirty days), with id. § 246(c) (2) (ninety days). A test that triggers unfavorable
tax consequences if taxpayers eliminate "substantially all" risk of loss is clearly less de-
manding than the one that applies even to those who merely "substantially diminish" that
risk. Compare STAFF OFJ. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 1997, at 177 (Comm. Print 1997) (interpreting § 1259 to
include transactions that "have the effect of eliminating substantially all of the taxpayer's
risk of loss and opportunity for income and gain with respect to the appreciated financial
position" (emphasis added)), with I.KC. § 1092(c) (2) (2000) (using the "substantial
diminution" standard). Comparisons are rough, but they at least appear to be reasonably
plausible based on a general common sense of the drafter of a statute, regulation, or ju-
dicial opinion. But if we want to find and develop stronger discontinuous frictions, gen-
eral common sense will no longer suffice. As David Schizer explained, to identify and
evaluate these frictions one would need to be familiar with "a wide range of institutional
details, including the securities and commodities laws, the state of financial technology,
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reforms that require detailed knowledge of numerous and disparate
subjects needed to assess alternative frictions in favor of imperfect but
intuitive risk-based rules.27
Finally, while risk-based rules have many weaknesses, they are not
entirely useless. As Daniel Shaviro acknowledges, the considerable
cost of abandoning an ownership-based distinction in the context of
safe harbor leasing suggests that the existing risk-based regime had
some deterrent effect "at least in the early 1980s. "2" The significant
revenue projected from shutting down the modern version of lease-
related deduction trading suggests that a risk-based concept of tax
29ownership continues to play a meaningful role. While a large por-
tion of capital income escapes taxation, hundreds of billions of dollars
of interest, dividends, and capital gains are reported and taxed every
year.3° Thus, risk-based rules do raise revenue, although most likely at
a high (perhaps too high) cost. Because this revenue is concrete and
salient while the accompanying social welfare losses are hidden and
debated by economists, policymakers are likely to continue to rely on
risk-based rules for some time to come.
Make no mistake, this discussion is no ode to risk-based rules.
Their shortcomings are well-known and readily apparent from the
government's ongoing struggle to tax capital income. Rather, the
point is to emphasize that there are plenty of reasons to search for in-
cremental improvements. The following discussion is animated by
this goal.
accounting, and broker-dealer regulations." Schizer, Frictions, supra note 10, at 1335.
This, no doubt, is only a partial list.
27 Admittedly, even as far as continuous frictions go, risk is a particularly weak one.
For instance, the passive loss rules that force taxpayers to sacrifice their time to gain
tax benefits appear to be a more effective deterrent. See Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, supra
note 1, at 701.
28 Id. at 690.
See, e.g., Allen Kenney, SILO Shutdown: How the New Law Could Cripple the Indus-
ty, 105 TAx NoTEs 638, 638 (2004) (reporting that additional revenue from shutting
down lease-in, lease-out shelters is projected to be more than $25 billion by 2014, ac-
cording to congressional budget estimates).
30 For one estimate, see SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 23, at 33 tbl.2.3, 34-35 (re-
porting their estimates for the year 2000 and discussing why a large portion of capital
gains escapes taxation). In fact, according to some estimates, net capital gains are the
second largest component of the total adjusted gross income, following only wages and
salaries. See, e.g., id.
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II. UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENT TYPES OF RISK
The existing analysis of risk-based rules is extensive but incom-
plete. The commentary suffers from an insufficiently nuanced under-
standing of various forms of uncertainty. This Part distinguishes four
types of risk, laying the foundation for the discussion in the remainder
of the Article.
A. Market Risk
The multitude of risk-based rules in the Internal Revenue Code
has a certain intellectual tidiness: they all appear to work the same
way. All these rules allow taxpayers to claim tax benefits as long as
they accept the risk of adverse changes in market prices or asset val-
ues. I will call this type of uncertainty market risk.3"
The already familiar wash sale rule is just one example of a mar-
ket-risk-imposing provision. Similar waiting-period regimes apply to
dividends-received deductions, foreign tax credits,33 and hedges of
appreciated securities. These rules are only one type of provision
designed to impose market risk. Other examples include the con-
structive sale rule,3  the constructive ownership rule,3 6 the straddle
37 1 38rules, the conversion transaction provision, certain limitations on
31 More precisely, market risk is an unwanted risk of price changes incurred by a
passive investor (that is, an owner who has no inside information about the asset's
value and cannot influence this value by personal efforts). Thus, market risk arises
even if a particular asset is not traded in a liquid (or any) market. However, because
most market-risk-imposing provisions do deal with fungible, actively traded assets, I use
the term market risk to provide an intuitive reference. My use of this term should not
be confused with its use in the corporate finance literature where market (or system-
atic, or undiversifiable) risk refers to the risk of owning a security that cannot be
eliminated by diversification. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCI-
PLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 168 (7th ed. 2003).
32 See I.R.C. § 246(c)(1)-(2) (2000).
33 See I.R.C. § 901(k), (1) (Supp. IV 2004).
34 See I.R.C. § 1259(c) (3) (2000).
35 See id. § 1259(a), (c)(1), (d) (market risk arises because taxpayers are forced to
hold appreciated positions that are hedged less than they would have preferred).
36 See id. § 1260(a), (d) (market risk arises because taxpayers are compelled to
gain less complete exposure to hedge funds than they would have liked).
37 See id. § 1092(a) (1) (market risk arises because taxpayers cannot substantially
diminish unwanted risk of loss without triggering adverse tax consequences).
38 See id. § 1258(c)(1) (market risk arises because taxpayers can avoid a tax-
increasing recharacterization only if they embed enough unwanted risk-based (non-
time-value) return in their transaction).
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interest deductions, some nonrecognition provisions,' ° and the so-
called "at risk" limitations. 4' The form and amount of risk forced
upon taxpayers vary, as do the tax benefits involved. But invariably, as
long as a taxpayer accepts the uncertainty and pays the price by incur-
ring market risk, she is fully entitled to claim the benefits. To facili-
tate the discussion, I will use the waiting-period provisions (primarily
the wash sale rule) as an example of a statutory risk-based rule de-
signed to impose market risk. This should not be interpreted as limit-
ing the analysis or the arguments. Both apply to many different risk-
based rules, including those enumerated above.
All the provisions just described are the so-called anti-abuse or
one-way rules.42 They can only increase one's tax burden, never re-
duce it. They accelerate gains, but not losses;43 defer losses, but not
44
gains; and recast low-taxed capital gain as high-taxed ordinary in-
come, but not vice versa. 45 Not all risk-based rules are like this. In
fact, the more general provisions-such as the rules defining tax own-
ership, debt, and equity-are typically symmetrical. Symmetrical rules
present the government with a unique problem. As soon as it tries to
turn them into a "stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer," they
invariably "metamorphose... into a large green snake and bite the
commissioner on the hind part."46 A reasonable solution is to design
39 See id. § 163(l) (market risk arises because corporate issuers are forced not to
price their equity-flavored securities in a way that would assure repayment in equity, as
they would have preferred).
40 See id. § 351 (g) (2) (A) (iii) (market risk arises because preferred stock whose re-
payment is too certain carries unfavorable tax consequences).
41 See id. § 465 (market risk arises because taxpayers lose investment-related deduc-
tions unless they make investments with their own money or fund investments with re-
course (rather than nonrecourse) debt).
42 See Schizer, Frictions, supra note 10, at 1323 n.29.
43 See I.R.C. § 1259 (2000) (applies only to appreciated financial positions); id.
§ 1260 (applies only to gain from constructive ownership transactions).
44 See id. §§ 1091, 1092.
45 See id. § 1258.
46 Martin D. Ginsburg, Making the Tax Law Through the Judicial Process, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1984, at 74, 76. For instance, if the government makes it exceedingly easy to
characterize corporate securities as debt (and difficult to treat them as equity), corpo-
rations will significantly increase their interest deductions by issuing equity-like securi-
ties viewed as debt for tax purposes. If the government goes to the opposite extreme
(making debt characterization difficult and equity treatment easy), taxpayers will start
claiming many more tax benefits associated with dividend payments, such as a divi-
dends-received deduction and foreign tax credit. For a more detailed study of the
same dynamic using an example of a risk-based rule applicable to contingent payment
debt instruments, see David M. Schizer, Sticks and Snakes: Derivatives and Curtailing Ag-
gressive Tax Planning, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1339, 1377-92 (2000).
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symmetrical rules in a neutral fashion and then deter tax planning
with anti-abuse rules. For example, if corporate issuers start claiming
interest deductions on novel securities with many equity features, a re-
sponse would be not to shift the line between debt and equity, but
simply to deny interest deduction for this type of security. 7 In other
words, the vulnerability of symmetrical rules is precisely why anti-abuse
rules are important. Not all such rules must be risk based, but many
of them are. For the remainder of the Article, I will focus only on
anti-abuse (or one-way) risk-based rules.
B. Business Risk
A statutory rule that limits the benefits of tax-free incorporations
is an example of a provision designed to deter tax planning by impos-
ing business risk. While exchanges are generally taxable, 49 a taxpayer
who contributes her appreciated business assets to a corporation in
exchange for the corporation's stock is allowed to defer the tax on
built-in gain. 5  This favorable treatment is available, however, only if
the taxpayer controls that corporation "immediately after the ex-
change." 51 Courts and the IRS interpreted this requirement to mean
that the contributing taxpayer must hold the newly received stock for
some time. If the taxpayer plans to continue her business in a corpo-
rate form, this requirement hardly matters. But for a taxpayer who
would like to engage in a "drop-and-sell" sequence by "dropping" the
business assets into a corporation and immediately selling the corpo-
rate stock under the guise of a tax-free reorganization, keeping the
shares is undesirable. The taxpayer wants to eliminate her exposure
to the business as soon as possible. Instead, she must wait and assume
47 This is exactly what Congress did when it enacted I.R.C. § 163(l). Of course,
making the distinction between debt and equity irrelevant (e.g., by repealing the cor-
porate income tax) would solve the problem as well.
4 The so-called passive loss rules are an example of anti-abuse rules that are not
risk based. Rather, they exact the price from taxpayers who wish to claim tax benefits
in a coinage of time. See id. § 469 (2000); Schizer, Frictions, supra note 10, at 1324;
Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, supra note 1, at 701. Note that there is no general correlation
between the type of symmetrical rule and the type of related anti-abuse rule. Each rule
may be risk based or not. Passive loss rules are an example of non-risk-based anti-abuse
rules protecting symmetrical risk-based ownership and debt/equity rules.
4 See I.R.C. § 1001 (2000).
50 See id. § 351(a).
51 Id.
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a risk of adverse business developments in order to receive the desired
52
tax treatment. That is, she must accept business risk.
Another example of a business-risk-imposing rule comes from the
so-called liquidation-reincorporation controversy that embroiled the
IRS and numerous taxpayers prior to the 1986 tax reform. 53 As its
name suggests, the strategy involved a corporate liquidation followed
shortly by an incorporation of a new entity that often bore an uncanny
resemblance to the recently liquidated one. Taxpayers could claim a
variety of tax benefits if the liquidation and incorporation were viewed
as separate transactions. 54  The government argued, however, and
courts agreed, that if the incorporation followed the liquidation al-
most immediately, if the shareholders of the two entities were exactly
the same, if the whole transaction was completely prearranged, tax
benefits should be disallowed. 
5
52 Compare W. Coast Mktg. Corp. v. Comm'r, 46 T.C. 32 (1966) (treating the pur-
ported sale of stock of a newly incorporated business as a sale of assets because incor-
poration and sale were too closely linked), and Rev. Rul. 70-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73 (same),
with Culligan Water Conditioning of Tri-Cities, Inc. v. United States, 567 F.2d 867, 870
(9th Cir. 1978) (finding, based on "somewhat murky" facts, that the requirements of
§ 351 were met where the transfer of assets to the corporation occurred six months
prior to the sale of its stock), and Weikel v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 432 (1986) (re-
fusing to link the steps where assets were "dropped down" more than two months prior
to signing of the documents for the sale of stock and four months prior to the sale's
closing, distinguishing West Coast Marketing and Rev. Rul. 70-140 by highlighting con-
siderable uncertainty of the second-step sale at the time of the first-step incorporation,
and relying on Vest v. Comm'r, 57 T.C. 128 (1971), rev'd on other grounds, 481 F.2d 238
(5th Cir. 1973)). See generally 1 BORIS I. BITrKER &JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 3.09[2] (7th ed. 2006). The op-
posite scenario presented the same issue until Congress intervened in 1954 and, again,
in 1986. A taxpayer wanted to sell her company, but the buyer wanted to purchase the
company's assets. The obvious solution was for the taxpayer to liquidate the corpora-
tion, receive its assets, and sell them to the buyer. If the two steps were too interlinked,
however, they were combined. Compare Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331
(1945) (affirming the Tax Court judgment linking the steps), with United States v.
Cumberland Pub. Serv., 338 U.S. 451 (1950) (upholding the Court of Claims decision
declining to combine the steps on similar facts). Separating the steps to gain a benefit
of a tax-free distribution of corporate assets exposed the taxpayer to a risk of holding
these assets until their ultimate sale without the protection of a corporate shield. See
BIrKER & EUSTICE, supra, 10.05 [5] [a].
53 See BITrKER & EUSTICE, supra note 52, 110.08.
These benefits included a bailout of corporate earnings at the tax-preferred
capital gains rate, a step-up in tax basis of business assets, a recognition of loss built
into the stock of a liquidated entity, and so on. See id. 12.64[1] [a].
55 Specifically, the government argued that the transaction should be treated as a
nontaxable reorganization or a taxable dividend of all accumulated earnings and prof-
its. Neither characterization would give rise to recognition of loss or increase in basis
of corporate assets, and the latter would create additional taxable income for the tax-
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But taxpayers could bolster their cases in several ways. First, they
could hold the business in a noncorporate form for some time prior
to reincorporating it.5 Second, they could shut it down completely
and then restart the enterprise by forming a new corporation. 57 If the
termination was real, or if taxpayers operated an unincorporated
business long enough, courts refused to combine the steps. Strength-
ening the tax arguments came at a cost, however. Operating an unin-
corporated business exposed taxpayers to unlimited liability. 58 Allow-
ing the business to remain entirely dormant raised a risk of losing
clients, contracts, employees, and new business opportunities.59 All of
these undesirable possibilities are examples of business risk. 6 Accept-
ing this risk has enabled taxpayers to claim many tax benefits resulting
not only from the liquidation-reincorporation and drop-and-sell two-
steps, but from other transactional patterns as well.61
Note that, unlike market risk imposed by clear statutory rules con-
sidered in the previous Section, business risk typically arises from judi-
cial action. In fact, just in dealing with the liquidation-reincorporation
controversy, courts have focused on an ambiguous statutory term
on some occasions and disregarded the transactions altogether as
payer. See, e.g., Simon v. Comm'r, 644 F.2d 339, 341-43 (5th Cir. Unit B Apr. 1981);
Moffatt v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 558, 573-82 (1964); Rev. Rul. 76-429, 1976-2 C.B. 97;
BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 52, 12.64 [1 ] [c].
56 See, e.g., Swanson v. United States, 319 F. Supp. 959, 960 (E.D..Cal. 1970) (ex-
plaining that taxpayer operated as sole proprietor "for a time"); Kind v. Comm'r, 54
T.C. 600, 605 (1970) (recognizing a seven-month gap between liquidation of a flower
shop and incorporation of its successor); Mathis v. Comm'r, 19 T.C. 1123, 1129 (1953)
(documenting a nine-month gap between liquidation of a lumber company and incor-
poration of its successor).
57 See, e.g., Pridemark, Inc. v. Comm'r, 345 F.2d 35, 38-42 (4th Cir. 1965).
58 See, e.g., Swanson, 319 F. Supp. at 960 (explaining that the taxpayer decided that
operating an unincorporated business following the liquidation "was unsatisfactory,
primarily because it required him to risk all his personal assets in his new ventures");
Kind, 54 T.C. at 605 (finding that the taxpayer operated an unincorporated business
for seven months "without the protection of a corporate umbrella").
59 See, e.g., Pridemark, 345 F.2d at 38-39, 41-42.
60 I introduce the concept of business risk through a series of examples because it
is, essentially, a catchall category. Business risk is an unwanted business-related uncer-
tainty other than market risk, credit risk, see infta note 76, and counterparty risk, see
infra text accompanying note 73.
61 See, for example, United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv., 338 U.S. 451 (1950)
and Comm'r v. Court Holding, 324 U.S. 331 (1945), discussed in note 52, supra.
62 The term is "reorganization." See BrlTKER & EusTIcE, supra note 52, 12.64[2] [b]
(referring to courts' use of three different types of reorganizations to characterize a liq-
uidation followed by a reincorporation). The "immediately after the exchange" clause of
§ 351 is another example of a statutory term interpreted to impose business risk.
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"shams" on others. But most often, courts have invoked broad tax
common law doctrines of substance-over-form and, especially, step
transaction. 64 These doctrines do not speak the language of risk and
do not look anything like the detailed statutory rules discussed ear-
lier.65 Yet they have an effect of forcing taxpayers to bear risk, and I
will treat them as just another kind of risk-based rule in the remainder
of the Article.
C. Counterparty Risk
Market and business risks are not the only kinds of uncertainty
that taxpayers are willing to accept as a price of gaining tax advantage.
One of the most popular techniques used to deal with transactions
that have unfavorable tax consequences is to break them into separate
steps. In some contexts, as in the liquidation-reincorporation exam-
ple, all steps are within the control of a single taxpayer or group of
taxpayers. These taxpayers either assume no risk at all, or they take
on business risk. But in many other instances, separating the steps in-
volves a kind of uncertainty very different from that discussed thus far.
For instance, a publicly traded acquiring corporation (the "Ac-
quirer") may decide to purchase a smaller company (the "Target").
The Target's owner (the "Seller") generally prefers cash considera-
tion, but would like to have an opportunity to defer her gain from the
sale, perhaps until the following tax year. To do this, the Seller must
accept stock consideration instead. Can she have it both ways? Possi-
bly. The parties will split the transaction into two steps. First, the
Seller will transfer the Target to the Acquirer in exchange for the Ac-
quirer's stock. Second, the Seller will sell that stock for cash. For tax
purposes, the Seller will take a view that the transaction in the first
step is a tax-free reorganization and will recognize gain only upon the
later sale. To execute this sale without violating the securities laws,
however, the Seller will need the Acquirer's assistance. 6 The Seller's
63 See BrFKER & EUsTICE, supra note 52, 12.64[1 ] [c].
64 See id.
65 The step transaction doctrine, for instance, applies when the steps are "interde-
pendent," or when a court is convinced that "the end result" of a sequence of steps was
predetermined before the first step was made. For a discussion, see id. 12.61 [3].
The Acquirer's stock received by the Seller will be "restricted," and the Acquirer
will need to file a registration statement with the SEC before this stock can be sold to
the general public. See McDonald's Rests. of Ill., Inc. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520, 522
(7th Cir. 1982); Penrod v. Comm'r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1419 (1987); Heintz v. Comm'r, 25
T.C. 132, 138 (1955).
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business preference is to ensure this assistance in advance. Yet if the
transaction is too prearranged (if, for example, the Acquirer is legally
bound to assist the Seller in disposing of the Acquirer's stock), a court
will invoke the step transaction doctrine, disregard the intermediate
67stock transfer, and defeat the Seller's tax planning strategy.
To take another example, consider a corporation whose manager
(the "Liquidator") wants to terminate the corporation's wholly owned
subsidiary and recognize a taxable loss. The plan is to sell all of the
subsidiary's assets and distribute cash in a complete liquidation.
However, as long as the parent corporation owns more than 80% of
the subsidiary shares, it will not be allowed to deduct the loss. 68 The
solution comes in the face of the Liquidator's long-term customer
(the "21-Holder") who purchases 21% of the subsidiary stock, waits,
and, in the second step, receives the liquidation proceeds. Because
the corporation owns only 79% of the subsidiary at the time of liqui-
dation, the desired loss is deductible. If there is enough uncertainty
surrounding the eventual liquidation when the Liquidator sells the
21% interest, this strategy works. 69
Yet another example brings us back to wash sales. A taxpayer (the
"Wash Seller") wants to recognize a loss on one of her stocks, but does
not want to sell it. Cognizant of the wash sale rule, she sells the loss
67 Compare McDonald's Rests., 688 F.2d at 525 (holding that, because there was too
much certainty regarding the second step, the transaction was a taxable cash sale), and
Heintz, 25 T.C. at 142-43 (holding that, because there was too much certainty regarding
the second step-even though the planned public sale of the Acquirer's stock by the
Seller fell through and the Acquirer arranged for a private sale later-the Seller was
not entitled to the benefits of a tax-free reorganization), with Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1437
(finding that there was not enough certainty regarding the second step, respecting
separate steps, and giving the Seller the benefit of nonrecognition of gain in the first
step). Similar issues arise in the so-called bootstrap acquisitions, where certainty of the
second-step sale of a corporation determines whether a pre-sale dividend paid by that
corporation to the selling shareholder is respected or treated as part of the purchase
price. Compare Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v. Comm'r, 314 F.2d 96, 98 (6th Cir.
1963) (treating the dividend as part of the purchase price), with Walker v. Comm'r,
544 F.2d 419, 422 (9th Cir. 1976) (respecting the dividend form). See generally BITrKER
& EusTiCE, supra note 52, 1 8.07[2] [a]. For an example of cooperative tax planning in
international context, see Koehring Co. v. United States, 583 F.2d 313, 315-17 (7th Cir.
1978), describing how a U.S. company relied on its long-term U.K. partner to circum-
vent the controlled foreign corporation provisions.
For a detailed discussion, see BITKER & EuSTIcE, supra note 52, 10.21 [3] [a].
69 See Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670, 674 (1st Cir. 1956) (allow-
ing the loss); Comm'r v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 151 F.2d 517, 519-20 (3d Cir. 1945)
(same); BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 52, 10.21[3] [a] (referring to the Day & Zim-
mermann decision as "surprising" but conceding that it "now seems sanctified by the
passage of time").
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security to an old friend (the "Wash Buyer"), and the parties agree-
informally-that the taxpayer will buy the stock back for the same
price in thirty-one days. If the repurchase is a forgone conclusion, the
loss is disallowed.70
The common feature of all these fact patterns (and of many
others71) is that in each case, a taxpayer (the Seller, the Liquidator,
and the Wash Seller) changes the transaction to achieve a better tax
result. The key to the strategy is to leave a critical aspect of the deal
outside of the formal, legally enforceable agreement. This approach
leads to the creation of "relational contracts"-a term widely used in
the contract law scholarship. Charles Goetz and Robert Scott defined
a relational contract as an agreement between parties who are "inca-
pable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined
obligations." 2 When it comes to tax planning, the parties are some-
times "incapable" of formalizing a given term-or, rather, unwilling to
do so-because documenting it would produce adverse tax conse-
quences. I will refer to tax strategies of this type as relational tax plan-
ning. Thus, relational tax planning occurs when taxpayers deliberately
avoid formalizing certain aspects of their transactions because doing
so would produce undesirable tax results.
Like all relational contractors, relational tax planners must accept
risk. The uncertainty comes, however, not from business exigencies
or price fluctuations, but from reliance on a contractual counterparty.
The Acquirer may "defect" and renege on a soft promise to assist in
selling its stock received by the Seller in the first step. Therefore, the
70 See Stein v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 992,995 (1977) (disallowing the loss).
71 For instance, consider an isolated sale-repurchase agreement (or "repo").
Imagine a company that needs to borrow $2 million, and has $2 million worth of mu-
nicipal bonds that it can pledge as collateral (but does not want to sell). The company
has a close relationship with a bank. The policy of the company's president, however,
is not to borrow. Besides, the bank's lending limit to a single customer is only
$800,000. One solution would be for the company to sell the bonds to the bank for $2
million and simultaneously enter into a contract to buy them back for the same price,
allowing the bank to keep the tax-exempt interest on municipal bonds. This transac-
tion will probably be treated as a secured loan for tax purposes, however, and the in-
terest received by the bank on the municipal bonds will be taxable. An alternative so-
lution would be for the parties not to enter into a repurchase agreement. Instead, the
bank will retain the right to sell the bonds back to the company for $2 million, but the
company will not be able to compel the bank to do so. Without this right, the com-
pany will assume a risk that the bank will decide to keep the bonds. See Citizens Nat'l
Bank of Waco v. United States, 551 F.2d 832, 843 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (refusing to treat such
a transaction as a secured loan).
72 CharlesJ. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1091 (1981).
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Seller is at risk of being unable to cash out as (or as soon as) she
would have preferred. Similarly, the Liquidator may break the prom-
ise of a speedy cash-only liquidation, so the 21-Holder is at risk of be-
ing stuck with the unwanted shares, or receiving a liquidating distribu-
tion of the subsidiary's assets rather than cash. The 21-Holder,
however, may also defect and sell his 21% interest to a third party that
may be uncooperative in facilitating the liquidation. The friendly
wash sale may go awry, too. The Wash Buyer may refuse to resell, and
the Wash Seller may refuse to repurchase.
I will refer to this type of uncertainty as counterparty risk. To sim-
plify the discussion, I will assume that a taxpayer (the "Taxpayer") is
always the party structuring the transaction, deciding how much risk
to accept, and ultimately incurring a risk of relying on her contractual
counterparty (the "Counterparty"). This assumption is hardly a
stretch. The Counterparty may always condition his assistance on• 71
eliminating any exposure to the risk of the Taxpayer's defection.
Even if both parties assume counterparty risk, it appears highly
unlikely that, when the Taxpayer requests the Counterparty's assis-
tance, the resulting transaction imposes more risk on the Counter-
party than on the Taxpayer. If so, we can think of counterparty risk
borne by Taxpayers as the net of the two offsetting counterparty risks.
Is counterparty risk different from market and business risks in a
meaningful way? They all have something in common. The Counter-
party may defect because unexpected market fluctuations or business
exigencies make the promised performance too costly. This danger
reflects market and business risks. But the critical components of
counterparty risk depend on factors very different from asset prices or
commercial misfortunes. Most importantly, the information available
to the Taxpayer and the Counterparty is almost always asymmetric and
often imperfect. The Taxpayer will need to decide whether to accept
counterparty risk without knowing as much about the Counterparty as
the Taxpayer would like. And even if the Taxpayer assures herself
that the Counterparty is a reliable cooperator at the time they take the
first step, the Counterparty may later defect due to changed prefer-
73 For instance, the Wash Buyer may agree to purchase the loss security only if the
Taxpayer gives her a free put option to resell it back to the Taxpayer for the same
price. An at-the-money put option does not defeat the tax strategy, and it eliminates
the Counterparty's exposure to the Taxpayer's defection. Cf Rev. Rul. 85-87, 1985-1
C.B. 268 (holding that § 1091 disallows a loss from a sale of stock if the taxpayer simul-
taneously sells an in-the-money put option on the same stock and there is no substan-
tial likelihood that the put will not be exercised).
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ences or new information. Or she may act opportunistically and hold
up the Taxpayer, trying to extract a quasi-rent. 74 In other words, the
key elements of counterparty risk depend on the Counterparty's idio-
syncratic, unobservable attributes and strategic behavior rather than
on the actions of third parties not involved in the risk-generating
transaction, as is true of market and business risks.h
Taxpayers in all three examples considered in this section accept
counterparty risk. All three strategies are instances of relational tax
planning. But each example is different from the others in important
respects. The Acquirer and the Seller in the first scenario are unfa-
miliar with each other. They are strangers who agree to cooperate in
carrying out an isolated transaction. In contrast, the 21-Holder is the
Liquidator's long-term customer. They have a long-term commercial
relationship. The Wash Seller and the Wash Buyer also know each
other well, but their connection is purely social. The significance of
these distinctions will become clear as the discussion progresses.76
74 For a definition of opportunistic behavior, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47-49 (1985) ("By opportunism I mean self-
interest seeking with guile."). For a discussion of holdups, see Benjamin Klein, Why
Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 ECON. INQUIRY
444 (1996) [hereinafter Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur]. For an explanation of quasi-rents,
see Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Ap-
propriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 298-302
(1978).
75 _ [S] trategic behavior' is concerned with influencing another's choice by work-
ing on his expectation of how one's own behavior is related to his." THOMAS C.
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 15 (1980 ed.). Relational contractors have
developed several ways to control strategic bargaining and asymmetric information
problems. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts, 1985
WIS. L. REV. 527, 531 (arguing that parties "enter into [long-term] agreements to
achieve the benefits of cooperation," not "because of their concern for the future
course of prices"); Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur, supra note 74, at 458-59 (explaining how
contractors shift private enforcement capital to alleviate contracting difficulties);
Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM.
ECON. REV. 519, 524, 531 (1983) [hereinafter Williamson, Credible Commitments] (de-
scribing how hostages assure contractual performance). More generally, transactors
adopt various institutional frameworks (or governance structures) to overcome the dif-
ficulties of imperfect bargaining. See Oliver E. Williamson, 7ransaction-Cost Economics:
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 234-35, 247-54 (1979)
[hereinafter Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics]. Yet the bargaining problems can-
not be eliminated entirely. Thus, the term "counterparty risk" should be viewed as re-
ferring to the residual risk that remains after the parties have reduced uncertainty to
the extent possible.
76 See infra text accompanying notes 259 & 265-270. Yet another type of uncer-
tainty arises whenever a taxpayer transacts with third parties who may default on their
binding contractual obligations. This is credit risk. Occasionally, taxpayers who accept
it escape unpleasant tax consequences. For example, § 163(l) grants interest deduc-
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D. Multilateral Counterparty Risk
The statutory provisions and judicial precedents considered below
will appear to be an eclectic collection even to a knowledgeable tax
observer. And they certainly do not belong to any accepted doctrinal
category. Yet all tax-planning strategies discussed in this Section share
the same characteristic: they involve taxpayers who rely on counter-
parties in settings where their interactions are observable by members
of the group that has adopted certain rules of behavior fitting under
the broad rubric of social norms.
For example, a controlling shareholder (the "Parent") of a family-
owned business may want to gradually transfer control over the busi-
ness to the younger generation (the "Children"). If the business is
profitable and the Children do not have a lot of cash (not an uncom-
mon situation), the easiest way to accomplish this goal is for the Chil-
dren to acquire just a few shares each and for the company to gradu-
ally redeem the Parent's stock. These redemptions, however, will be
treated as dividends 77-a tax-unfavorable result. A complete stock re-. • 78
demption generally receives a tax-preferred sale characterazation.
Yet the Parent is not ready to give up management and control of the
company. The promising strategy is to redeem all of the Parent's
tions to issuers of certain debt-equity units only if they make debt and forward compo-
nents separable, accepting credit risk of public investors who may default and refuse to
perform under the forward. For a discussion, see Schizer, Frictions, supra note 10, at
1330-31 (explaining that because the corporate issuer will have no assurances that pub-
lic investors will make payments if an issuer's stock price declines, "naked" publicly
traded forwards are "unworkable"). To the extent that credit risk is conceived of as
arising because of counterparties' possible insolvency or bankruptcy (which, one may
assume, counterparties do not deliberately bring upon themselves), it is very similar to
business risk. However, credit risk also reflects a possibility that a solvent counterparty
will simply breach its contract with the taxpayer. While existence of an enforceable
contractual obligation makes this type of risk different from counterparty risk, an op-
portunity for strategic actions by the counterparty is present in both cases. Thus,
credit risk is better understood as a hybrid between business and counterparty risks. I
will not discuss it further because analysis applicable to each of the "basic" risks applies
to credit risk to the extent it reflects each basic type in any given case.
77 See I.R.C. § 302(b) (2000) (defining several tests that must be met in order for a
corporate distribution not to be treated as a dividend).
78 See id. § 302(b)(3). Since 2003, dividends are often taxed at a lower capital
gains rate, so the disparity between the dividend and sale treatments is not as drastic as
it has been for years. However, the entire amount of the dividend is includable in
gross income (assuming the company has sufficient accumulated earnings and profits,
see id. § 316 (a)), while only the excess of the amount received in a full redemption over
the shareholder's basis in the redeemed stock is generally subject to tax, see id.
§ 1001 (a). Thus, a sale treatment continues to be tax-preferred for individual share-
holders.
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stock, with an understanding that the Parent will reacquire some of
the shares soon thereafter and that the Children will operate the
business in (close) consultation with the Parent in the meantime.
Even though understandings like this are unwritten, ambiguous, and
unenforceable, they are clearly strengthened by the fact that uncoop-
erative actions by the Children will lead to much more than the Par-
ent's displeasure. Rather, the entire fabric of the (often extended)
family will be at risk. Not surprisingly, Congress considered implicit
agreements of this type so powerful that it decided to treat even a full
redemption of the Parent's interest as a dividend.7 9
Family norms are not the only ones recognized by the tax law. A
custom developed in the repo market provides another example. A
repo is a sale of securities followed by a later repurchase for the same
price (sometimes increased by an interest component). The market
practice that emerged among commercial banks and municipal bond
dealers who entered into thousands of repos over decades of doing
business was to eschew formal repurchase agreements. 80 The parties
relied on an implicit understanding that the repo'd municipal bonds
would be repurchased on either party's request for the initial sale
price. "' Violators of this informal custom faced a nearly certain expul-
sion from the market. Courts recognized the custom's strength, con-
cluded that taxpayers did not incur a meaningful risk by relying on a
tacit understanding (rather than a legally enforceable contract) to re-
purchase, and denied the desired tax benefits. s2
Another norm exists between tax-exempt charities and wealthy
donors (or so it appears based on the number of cases with strikingly
similar fact patterns). Well-to-do benefactors donate appreciated se-
curities to charities on an understanding that the charities will follow
the benefactors' wishes regarding a quick disposition of these securi-
79 See id. §§ 302, 318; see also United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970). A limited ex-
ception to this draconian rule is discussed below. See infra text accompanying note 223.
8o For a detailed description, see Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms, supra note 6, at
625-27.
81 The market practice reverted to fully documented repurchase agreements to
clarify the uncertain legal status of repos highlighted by a high-profile bankruptcy. See
MARCIA STIGUM, THE REPO AND REVERSE MARKETS 218-21 (1989) (describing the 1982
Lombard-Wall bankruptcy and the development of a new standardized repo agree-
ment).
82 See First Am. Nat'l Bank of Nashville v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir.
1972); Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d 115 (6th Cir.
1970); Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. United States, 421 F.2d 442, 453-54 (5th Cir. 1970).
But see Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. United States, 573 F.2d 1201, 1205-07 (Ct. Cl. 1978)
(holding for taxpayer on similar facts).
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ties and a certain use of the proceeds.83  If everything works as
planned, donors end up using charities to shelter an otherwise taxable
gain from the sale of securities.8 4 There is always a chance, however,
that the charity will not cooperate. As in repo cases, the government
has tried to convince courts that the donor and charity had a tacit
agreement and that the risk that a charity would deviate from this
agreement was too low. Unlike in the repo controversy, courts mostly
took the taxpayer's side, often stressing that the donor had no legally
enforceable right to compel the charity to act as the donor desired.
5
I will call the risk assumed by the Parent, repo market partici-
pants, and wealthy donors a multilateral counterparty risk, or simply
multilateral risk. It is a form of counterparty risk because it involves re-
liance on another person (rather than exposure to impersonal market
fluctuations or business contingencies). Thus, multilateral risk ac-
companies relational tax planning. The difference is that cooperation
(or defection) by the Counterparty in this case is observed by other
members of a group (Children's family members, repo market par-
ticipants, or donors and charitable organizations)-a feature that
gives rise to the unique costs and benefits discussed below. Because
multilateral risk is closely related to counterparty risk, I will focus
mostly on the latter type, except where the differences between the
two become relevant.
83 The charity may use the money to purchase a taxpayer's yacht, see, e.g., Blake v.
Comm'r, 697 F.2d 473, 474 (2d Cir. 1982), or a building owned by the taxpayer, see,
e.g., Carrington v. Comm'r, 476 F.2d 704, 709 (5th Cir. 1973), or the charity may sim-
ply cooperate with the taxpayer in liquidating the corporation that issued the donated
securities, see, e.g., Grove v. Comm'r, 490 F.2d 241, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1973); DeWitt v.
United States, 204 Ct. Cl. 274, 279-89 (1974); Palmer v. Comm'r, 62 T.C. 684, 685-90
(1974).
84 The charity's cooperation is important because a sale of appreciated securities
by a taxpayer produces a taxable gain, while a sale of the same securities by a tax-
exempt charity has no tax consequences. If a charity sells the securities and uses the
proceeds to, say, purchase a building from the donor, the end result is that the donor
parts with the building (which he essentially contributes to the charity) and sells the
securities for cash without recognizing gain on that sale.
85 Among the charitable donation cases cited above, Blake is the only government
win. The IRS's attempt to rely on this case without repealing a revenue ruling acqui-
escing in the earlier taxpayer-favorable decisions prompted a stiff rebuke from the Tax
Court. SeeRauenhorstv. Comm'r, 119 T.C. 157, 169-73 (2002).
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III. THE PROBLEM OF RELATIONAL TAx PLANNING
A. Wat Is the Problem?
While the fundamental difference between various types of risk
has not attracted much scholarly attention, taxpayers seized the op-
portunity to exploit this difference long ago. Inevitably, this made
tax planning easier.
The wash sale rule again provides a convenient point of depar-
ture. The rule imposes a waiting period and disallows certain forms
of hedging, but says little about who could be the buyer of the de-
preciated security.86 The omission invites an obvious "solution": sell
the security to a friend and buy it back in thirty-one days. This is the
friendly wash sale example. In the real friendly wash sale case, the
court handed a decisive victory to the IRS even though it had to
stretch the statutory language considerably. The extra effort was
well justified. Earlier, I discussed the wash sale rule as a type of pro-
vision that imposes market risk. Yet the uncertainty assumed by the
taxpayer who entered into the friendly wash sale was different-it
was what I have called counterparty risk. While the court did not
analyze the transaction in these terms, it recognized that the tax-
payer's strategy significantly reduced the amount of risk she in-
curred. That diminished risk was too low a price to obtain the de-
sired tax benefit.
This example is a stark illustration of why relational tax planning
presents a serious threat to the efficacy of risk-based rules. Clearly,
the vast majority of these rules are designed to impose market risk.
Many provisions in the Code and Treasury regulations explicitly re-
86 The related party rules make sure that the purchaser is not the seller's close
relative, see I.R.C. § 267 (2000), but beyond that anything is fair game, or at least it so
appears on the face of the statute. For a discussion of the relevant cases and a proposal
to add a broad related-party rule to the wash sale regime, see Schizer, Wash Sale Rules,
supra note 3, at 75-76.
87 The court announced, for instance, that the wash sale loss was allowed only if
"there was no express or implied agreement to buy back" the loss security, without offer-
ing any support for this proposition. Stein v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 992, 994
(1977) (emphasis added). Section 1091 provides that a loss is disallowed if, within the
thirty-day period, "it appears that... the taxpayer has acquired.., or has entered into
a contract or option to so acquire, substantially identical stock or securities." I.R.C.
§ 1091(a). While the "it appears" clause suggests that the provision should be read
broadly, it was clear that the taxpayer had nothing close to an enforceable contract to
repurchase the security for the same price. The Stein court cited no authority support-
ing its conclusion that an "implied agreement" is a "contract" within the meaning of
§ 1091.
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fer to market risk components such as risk of loss and opportunity
for gain. 8 Congress protects the rules' integrity by forbidding exces-
sive reduction of market risk through hedging and, sometimes, di-
versification.s9 Numerous references to market risk in the legislative
history eliminate any doubt about the congressional focus on that
type of uncertainty. 90 Moreover, the main academic critique of risk-
based rules is that they are incapable of subjecting taxpayers to a
meaningful market risk. 9' Thus, commentators also view these rules
as designed to impose market risk.9
Understanding that most risk-based rules are written with market
risk in mind is important for a simple reason: it means that the rules
are calibrated based on this assumption. That is, when Congress de-
cided that waiting for thirty days is long enough to deduct a wash
sale loss, it evaluated the resulting risk by reference to fluctuations in
stock prices, not the strength of the wash seller's relationship with
her potential counterparty.
But why does it matter? Counterparty risk, it appears, is as good
a deterrent as any other type of uncertainty. We can view various
risks as different currencies. When we shop at a duty-free store, we
do not think that because prices are listed in dollars and euros we
can reap huge savings by paying in one currency or the other. Rela-
tional tax planning presents a problem only if counterparty risk is
likely to be lower than the corresponding market risk most of the
time. Is this a reasonable assumption?
If the strategy involves a fungible asset, the answer is unambigu-
ously yes. This is so because if the Counterparty defects, the Tax-
payer always has an option of acquiring an identical asset on the
88 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 246(c) (4), 1058(b) (3), 1092(c) (2), 1259(c) (3).
89 See id. § 246(c) (1) (B) (waiting period suspended while the "taxpayer is under
an obligation.., to make related payments with respect to positions in substantially
similar or related property"); id. § 901(k) (1) (A) (ii) (same); Treas. Reg. § 1.246-5
(1995) (defining positions in "substantially similar or related property" to include cer-
tain portfolios of stocks).
' See, e.g., supra note 26.
91 See articles cited supra notes 2 and 15.
92 Several tax rules are designed to impose business risk. The term "reorganiza-
tion" and the "immediately after the exchange" requirement of § 351 are prime exam-
ples. Only those corporate sales that qualify as "reorganizations" are eligible for a de-
sirable deferral of gain. In order for the exchange to qualify, however, at least a
portion of consideration received by the seller must come in the form of buyer's stock.
That is, the seller cannot completely cash out. Ownership of stock involves business
risk. For a discussion of the "immediately after the exchange" requirement, see supra
text accompanying notes 51-52.
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market. 93 If the asset is unique, however, the Counterparty may hold
up the Taxpayer, forcing her to pay more than the asset's fair
value.9 Thus, it is possible that relying on the Counterparty will turn
out to be worse than accepting market risk.
Possible, but unlikely. This is precisely why taxpayers choose to
engage in relational tax planning. Their revealed preference is the
best proof that the expected cost of counterparty risk incurred by re-
lational tax planners is smaller than the expected cost of the corre-
sponding market risk. 95 If the price of obtaining a tax benefit is set
assuming that taxpayers transact at arm's length, but they actually
engage in friendly exchanges with acquaintances, long-term clients,
customers, or business associates, the real price turns out to be too
low, and tax planning is underdeterred.
B. How Serious Is the Problem?
Congress, the Treasury, and the courts clearly recognize the
threat of relational tax planning. They attack it both ex ante and
ex post. Unfortunately, both types of response are ineffective.
Efforts to deter relational tax planning on an ex ante basis mani-
fest themselves in a dizzying array of references to informal under-
standings scattered throughout the Treasury regulations. These pro-
visions (numbered in dozens) warn that the government will take into
93 One of the key insights of transaction cost economics is that easily available al-
ternatives eliminate the threat of opportunism. See, e.g., Williamson, Transaction-Cost
Economics, supra note 75, at 239 ("The crucial investment distinction is this: to what
degree are transaction-specific (nonmarketable) expenses incurred. Items that are
unspecialized among users pose few hazards, since buyers in these circumstances can
easily turn to alternative sources, and suppliers can sell output intended for one order
to other buyers without difficulty.").
94 The holdup problem is one of the central issues studied by contract and organ-
izational theorists. See, e.g., Introduction to CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND OR-
GANIZATION 7 (Scott E. Masten ed., 1996); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Precontrac-
tual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 685-87, 693-702 (2007).
95 To be sure, taking on counterparty risk while transacting with total strangers (as
in the Seller's sale of the Target to the Acquirer) is a risky proposition, so we may ex-
pect taxpayers to use it only as a last resort. Yet this point should not be overstated.
Robert Scott has identified many cases where transactors deliberately entered into un-
enforceable contracts without an expectation of future dealings and with no tax bene-
fits in sight. See Robert E. Scott, A Theoy of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 1641, 1644 (2003). Of course, relational tax planning that involves
friends (like the Wash Seller and Wash Buyer) or long-term business partners (like the
Liquidator and 21-Holder) is a different story. The Taxpayer knows the Counterparty
well, has an ongoing relationship with her, and has a good reason to believe that defec-
tion is unlikely.
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account notjust formal written contracts, but also "understandings" or
"arrangements" 96 that may be "written or oral,"97 "written or verbal," 9s
"formal or informal,"99 "express or implied,
'"' ° "implicit or explicit,"
0'
revealed by "a pattern of conduct,"'' 0 2 and whether or not they are "le-
gally binding on the taxpayer." 103 Yet the government almost never
relies on these provisions. 1°4 Moreover, on a few occasions the IRS dis-
regarded tacit understandings that taxpayers themselves revealed to
the government. The rulings cited-and ignored-direct references
to informal arrangements.' °5 The government's rare attempts to de-
scribe impermissible implicit agreements in detail produced volumi-
nous, transaction-specific, and increasingly taxpayer-favorable guid-106
ance. As a result, it is entirely unclear whether the varying
96 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-5 (a) (4) (as amended in 1994).
97 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.483-1 (a) (1), 1.1271-1 (a) (1) (1994).
98 Treas. Reg. § 48.4217-1 (as amended in 1985).
99 Treas. Reg. § 1.382-3(a) (1) (i) (as amended in 1993).
Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1 (a) (1) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.957-1 (b) (2) (as amended in
1997); Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(a) (as amended in 1960); Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-
2(c)(1) (2003).
101 Treas. Reg. § 1.355-7(h) (1) (i) (A) (2005).
102 Treas. Reg. § 1.507-2(a) (8) (iv) (A) (3) (i) (as amended in 1981).
103 Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (3) (ii) (as amended in 2003).
104 A review of dozens of regulatory references to informal understandings reveals
that all but a few of these provisions have never been invoked by the government in
litigation, formal guidance, or even informal guidance. For rare exceptions, see, for
example, Koehring Co. v. United States, 583 F.2d 313, 317 (7th Cir. 1978) and Guynn v.
United States, 437 F.2d 1148, 1150 (4th Cir. 1971). Note that in Koehring, the govern-
ment's case that a U.S. taxpayer had an implied agreement with a foreign co-owner of
a joint company was greatly helped by the fact, among others, that the foreign party's
directors referred to their participation as "nominal" in the minutes of the Board of
Directors meeting. 583 F.2d at 316.
105 For example, in I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-18-067 (Jan. 31, 1992), the IRS refused
to find that donors reserved present interest in paintings-even though they retained
them in their home until the donee-museum opened in the following year and even
though the parties expected that the donors would do so-because the donee had a
formal right to take control of the paintings. This ruling essentially ignored the state-
ment in the regulations that a taxpayer-donor will be treated as reserving present in-
terest if she "has an understanding, arrangement, agreement, etc., whether written or
oral, with the charitable organization which has the effect of reserving to, or retaining
in, such donor a right to the use, possession, or enjoyment of the property." Treas.
Reg. § 1.170A-5(a) (4) (as amended in 1994).
1 See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 52, 11.11[3] [d] (describing the govern-
ment's struggle with regulations enacted under § 355(e) to clarify when taxpayers will
be treated as having a plan to dispose of a newly received corporate stock, but which
have been called "a parody" and "the Matrix").
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references to informal understandings have identical scope and, if so,
what it is. 107
Even more troubling is the fact that while many risk-based rules
at least attempt to reach informal arrangements, many more do
not. The omission is particularly unfortunate because it allows
taxpayers to argue that it is deliberate. 8 Whatever one might
think about arguments based on negative inferences, they further
embolden many relational tax planners. 109
But the most disheartening conclusion is that the ex ante at-
tempts to address relational tax planning are unlikely to succeed
even if the government adds more references to tacit understand-
ings and attempts to use them whenever possible. Finding these
understandings is very difficult, and proving their existence in
court even more so-realities that are not lost on taxpayers.1 For
all these reasons, the deterrent effect of the current statutory and
107 Thus, while the regulatory admonitions appear to deter relational tax planning
through ex ante rules (rather than ex post standards), it is unclear whether they actu-
ally do so. The distinguishing feature of rules is that they give content to legal com-
mands before individuals act. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560 (1992). Whether the regulatory references to informal
understandings actually have specific content depends on whether their meaning is
(relatively) certain. If it is not, the apparent rule-like provisions are actually standards
whose content will be determined only ex post. See id. at 601. Because the references
in question have been used so rarely, it is unclear whether they establish a rule or a
standard. I refer to them under the rubric of an ex ante approach to highlight the dis-
tinction from court-created doctrines whose content is even less certain, and thus, that
are even more standard-like. This distinction also emphasizes the difference between
regulatory (ex ante) and judicial (ex post) solutions.
108 Congress and the Treasury know how to refer to tacit understandings well, the
argument goes. They have done so on many occasions. If a given provision includes
no reference to oral, implicit, or not legally binding arrangements, it must be because
the government does not object to their use in this particular context.
q09 Quite possibly, this kind of argument was precisely the reason why the Wash
Seller in the real friendly wash sale case was so confident in his strategy that he volun-
tarily revealed to the IRS the existence of an informal agreement to repurchase the
loss security. See Stein v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 992, 994 (1977).
10 In some cases the detection may be fairly easy, such as where taxpayers transact
on non-arm's-length terms. A repurchase of a loss security from a Wash Buyer at the
initial sale price, as well as a repurchase of municipal bonds by a repo seller, are exam-
ples of such transactions. Even here, however, the parties may make detection difficult
by selling for the market price and making compensating side payments not reflected
in any discoverable written agreement. On many other occasions, things will be even
less clear. For instance, the fact that the Acquirer assists the Seller in selling the Ac-
quirer's stock, or that a charity disposes of the donated securities exactly as the donor
would have wished, may suggest-but certainly does not prove (as the government has
learned on many occasions)-the existence of an informal understanding.
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regulatory responses to relational tax planning is questionable at
best.
Perhaps recognizing the severe difficulties of addressing the
problem ex ante, courts have developed ways to do the same after
the fact. The substance-over-form doctrine, and its narrower ver-
sion, the step transaction doctrine, give courts ample discretion to
take informal understandings into account. Yet they rarely do so.
The judicial rhetoric is sweeping but misleading. Courts applying
these doctrines purport to "bypass appearances ' and focus on
"the objective economic realities of a transaction rather than [on]
the particular form the parties employed."... However, even when
opinions favor the government, they usually do so based on legally
enforceable rights and obligations arising from the very documents
whose form they disregard.
Moreover, the facts-and-circumstances test used by courts to dis-
cern the substance of the transaction is highly open ended. In the
words of the leading treatise, "it is almost impossible to distill use-
ful generalizations from the welter of substance-over-form cases.
' '
1
3
Especially where informal arrangements become an issue, courts
seem to pay particular attention to taxpayers' intent and purpose.
In fact, one version of the step transaction doctrine-the end result
test-is explicitly intent based.14  As a result, courts occasionally
give credence to taxpayers' self-serving assertions regarding their
motive and intent-assertions that are often impossible to verify." 5
Granted, the government wins some cases that involve rela-
tional tax planning. But it also loses a lot. The charitable donation
decisions are a sobering reminder that courts can be remarkably
blind to apparent tacit understandings. In many other contexts,
1 TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 236 (2d Cir. 2006).
112 Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 573 (1978).
11 BORIS I. BIrrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ES-
TATES AND GIFTS 4.3.3 (Supp. 3 2004).
114 See, e.g., McDonald's Rests. of Ill., Inc. v. Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520, 524 (7th Cir.
1982); King Enters. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
115 See, e.g., True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1180 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
in part the lower court's summary judgment in favor of the IRS because the taxpayer's
intent regarding transfers among his controlled companies was unclear); Citizens Nat'l
Bank of Waco v. United States, 551 F.2d 832, 841 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (upholding a transac-
tion entered into "with no thought or purpose of tax evasion," even though when all
was said and done the bank ended up lending funds to the taxpayer and receiving tax-
exempt interest on that loan); Vaughn v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 893, 910 (1983) (explaining
that the Tax Court established an "independent purpose test" for intrafamily install-
ment sales).
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taxpayers prevailed in convincing judges that no such understand-
ings existed even among family members and long-term associ-
ates. " 6 Some tribunals gave full credence to formal transactions
between entities under common control, ignoring their relation-
ships entirely."' The Tax Court announced that in evaluating "le-
gal rights and interests created by a written instrument," it will ig-
nore most implicit arrangements altogether."8 These decisions
create a lot of room for creative relational tax planners. No doubt,
many take advantage.
How serious of a problem is this for our tax system? Most
likely, very serious. While the analysis of relational tax planning is
still in its early stages, it is already quite clear that the problem is
widespread, extending well beyond the relatively well-understood
phenomenon of intrafamily tax structuring. Relational tax plan-
ning is key to major tax-minimization strategies developed by fi-
nancial markets in recent years. Variable delivery prepaid for-
wards, actively traded cross-border swaps, and structured loans by
offshore hedge funds are just some examples."9 Charitable organi-
zations and wealthy benefactors have relied on relational tax plan-
ning for years. And it is no secret that the entire tax shelter indus-
try flourished in the late 1990s and early 2000s due in large part to• • 120
numerous tacit understandings among various participants.
Case law analysis provides further evidence. A significant por-
tion of the hundreds of cases invoking the substance-over-form and
step transaction doctrines involve relational tax planning. 12 These
cases, no doubt, represent just a small tip of the proverbial iceberg.
If it occurred to one taxpayer to circumvent the wash sale rule by
116 See, e.g., Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670, 677 (1st Cir. 1956)
(respecting a transitory sale of corporate stock to a long-term customer); Citizens Nat'
Bank of Waco, 551 F.2d at 843 (respecting the form of a repo entered into by a bank
and its long-term client); Richard Hansen Land, Inc. v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (CCH)
2869, 2874 (1993) (upholding a taxpayer-favorable treatment of a family trust); Bowen
v. Comm'r, 78 T.C. 55, 85 (1982) (approving an inter-spousal installment sale).
17 See, e.g, True, 190 F.3d at 1180-81; see also Comm'r v. W.F. Trimble & Sons Co., 98
F.2d 853 (3d Cir. 1938) (allowing a loss on a wash sale of a security from one wholly owned
corporation to another, followed by its repurchase slightly more than a month later).
118 Estate of Craft v. Comm'r, 68 T.C. 249, 263 (1977). For a discussion of this
opinion, see Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms, supra note 6, at 635-36.
1W For a detailed explanation, see Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norm, supra note 6, at 613-22.
12 See id. at 674.
121 A Westlaw search of the Federal Tax Cases Combined database reveals 186 cases
invoking the step transaction doctrine and 142 cases discussing the substance-over-
form doctrine (without also mentioning the step transaction doctrine).
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selling a loss security to a friend with an informal understanding to
repurchase it upon the expiration of the waiting period, we can be
sure that the same idea occurred to many others (who, unlike the
taxpayer in the actual friendly wash sale case, were unwilling to
admit openly the existence of an informal understanding). More-
over, many entrepreneurial minds have certainly realized that not
just the wash sale provision, but many other waiting-period and
other market-risk-imposing rules may be skirted using the same
technique. In fact, it is remarkable how easily various relational tax
planning strategies come to mind once one grasps the basic con-
cept. These strategies cost the government billions of dollars in
lost revenues.122
Relational tax planning is possible (and likely) whenever the
tax law relies on risk-based rules. These rules pervade the Internal
Revenue Code, the Treasury Regulations, and the tax common law.
But their sheer number does not determine the magnitude of the
problem. Most importantly, risk-based rules defend major fault
lines of our income tax system. The realization requirement, dou-
ble taxation of corporate income, worldwide taxation of U.S. resi-
dents, U.S. taxation of (certain) U.S.-source income of foreign tax-
payers, tax ownership, the distinction between risky and riskless
returns, as well as between capital and labor income, are all pro-
122 The government's recent inquiries into the schemes that may have allowed
wealthy foreigners to escape as much as one billion dollars in the U.S. dividend with-
holding tax are likely to uncover some such strategies already described in the aca-
demic literature. For the reference to the government interest, see Anita Raghavan,
IRS Probes Tax Goal of Derivatives, WALL ST.J.,July 19, 2007, at Cl. For the description
of the strategies, see Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms, supra note 6, at 618-22.
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tected by risk-based rules.123 All of these doctrines and distinctions
are vulnerable to relational tax planners.
Regulatory warnings about implicit understandings and tax com-
mon law anti-abuse doctrines discussed above surely have some deter-
rent effect. Whether they come close to being effective is another
matter. The many weaknesses of the current rules suggest that the
government's responses to relational tax planning have been unsuc-
cessful. Academics have done little to assist policymakers with devis-
ing alternative regimes.
IV. EVALUATING WELFARE CONSEQUENCES
OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF RISK
In order to conceive of-and evaluate-novel solutions, we need a
more sophisticated understanding of various types of risk. This Part
begins the inquiry. It demonstrates that market, business, and coun-
terparty risks systematically differ in their deterrent effects and social
welfare implications. Business risk is a stronger deterrent than equally
efficient market risk, and it is more efficient than equally deterring
market risk. Because counterparty risk is particularly complex, it is
difficult to draw general conclusions, at least as long as the current
rules remain in place.
123 The following table provides a partial list of one-way risk-based rules and the im-
plicated tax policy considerations, together with cross-references to specific examples:
Risk-Based Rule Tax Policy Issue Affected Reference
Taxation of capital vs. labor income (tax rate ap-
I.R.C. § 83 plicable to certain compensation based on whether
it is subject to a substantial risk)
§ 163(l) Double taxation of corporate income n.39
§ 246(c) (1), (2) Double taxation of corporate income n.32
§ 351 (g) Double taxation of corporate income n.40
§ 465 Taxation of risky vs. riskless returns n.41
§ 901(k), (1) Worldwide taxation of U.S. residents n.33
§ 1091 Realization requirement nn.3-5
§ 1092 Realization requirement n.37
§ 1258 Taxation of risky vs. riskless returns n.38
§ 1259 Realization requirement nn.34-35
§ 1260 Realization requirement n.36
Substance-over- A variety of issues, including:
form doctrine, Realization requirement nn.49-52
step transaction Double taxation of corporate income nn.53-61
doctrine Tax ownership n.71
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A. Market Risk
The basic economic effect of risk-based rules is well understood.
Faced with a choice between forgoing tax planning and assuming
market risk, some taxpayers prefer the former and others the latter.
Those who remain undeterred incur risk-bearing losses-a form of
deadweight loss.14 They worry about adverse market changes but con-
tinue with their tax planning anyway. Risk-bearing losses resulting
from incurring market risk (RBLM) are a pure social waste.
2 5
An additional-and similarly wasteful-response is to accept the
requisite risk in form but to try minimizing it in substance. Increasingly
sophisticated hedging strategies are being developed and sold to anx-
ious taxpayers who want to diminish their market risk. These schemes
come with high fees for promoters and lawyers, additional pointless
transactions needed only to support the tax arguments, and other costs.
Taxpayers' wasteful efforts of this type are not unique to risk-based
rules. These are generic transaction costs of tax planning. They are
roughly the same for taxpayers incurring all types of risk, and they enter
into both private and social cost equations. Therefore, I will ignore
these generic transaction costs in the remainder of the Article.
Note that the risk-bearing losses produced by risk-based rules are
different from the standard risk-bearing cost associated with tax
avoidance (or any possibly illegal behavior). That cost arises because
taxpayers take aggressive positions and then worry about possible au-
dits, litigation, penalties, and so on. 1 6 This uncertainty has nothing to
do with whether the rules the taxpayers may have violated are risk
based, or with whether a risk-based rule in question imposes one type
of risk or the other.17 Because the standard risk-bearing cost does not
illuminate the analysis of risk-based rules, I will ignore it as well.
124 A risk-bearing loss (or a risk premium) arises because for a concave utility func-
tion, the expected income and the certainty equivalent diverge. See ROSEN, supra note
8, at 267-69.
125 See Shaviro, Risk-Based Rules, supra note 1, at 674 ("Requiring taxpayers to bear
undesired risk as the price of receiving favorable tax treatment creates excess burden.").
126 See Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That Defi-
nitely Are Undesirable, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 9 (1992); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Ste-
ven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM.
ECON. REv. 880, 880 (1979).
127 For instance, a rule that determines whether a particular outlay is a (deducti-
ble) business expense or a (nondeductible) personal expenditure cannot be avoided
by accepting risk. Yet an entrepreneur who deducted some questionable items worries
about violating this rule just like an investor who hedged her appreciated stock posi-
tion a bit too perfectly worries about triggering a constructive sale (i.e., violating a risk-
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Losses from bearing market risk are not the only costs that may be
incurred by tax planners who face market-risk-imposing rules. When,
for example, a taxpayer sells a loss security onto the market, there is a
chance (am) that the security will appreciate and the taxpayer will have
to pay more to repurchase it than what she received from its earlier
sale. That difference is a market loss (LM). Of course, there is also a
possibility (1 - aM) that the loss security will depreciate during the
waiting period, and the taxpayer will gain GM from that decline upon
repurchase. The expected cost (or, if negative, benefit) of these pos-
sible outcomes is wholly separate from risk bearing, and it will exist
even for risk-neutral taxpayers. It may be described as:
amxLM- (1 - aM) x GM
Yet it is reasonable to ignore this component of market risk be-
cause its expected value is roughly zero. There is approximately the
same 50% chance that a given security will appreciate or decline by
any specific amount during a particular waiting period. Most wait-. • .c" 129
ing periods are short, so the time value element is insignificant.
The same is true of the risk premium. Furthermore, some risk-based
rules force taxpayers to take unwanted long positions, 130 while others
do the opposite. Therefore, even if slight appreciation is somewhat
more likely, taxpayers stand to gain from it in some cases and lose in
others. In sum, the expected gain or loss from market fluctuations is
so close to zero that it can be disregarded.
Finally, whenever a taxpayer engages in tax planning aimed at cir-
cumventing a market-risk-imposing rule, there is a chance (tPM) that
her plan will fail and she will end up paying tax T. The cost of this ex-
pected tax liability is tiM x T Therefore, the total private cost borne by
tax planners facing market risk is:
based rule). That is, both taxpayers are concerned about taking aggressive positions.
In contrast, a taxpayer who deducts an uncontroversial business expense has nothing
to worry about. But a taxpayer who clearly satisfies the wash sale rule and is entitled to
a loss deduction still incurs a risk-bearing loss because she is forced to accept 31 days'
worth of unwanted market exposure. This difference highlights a unique cost imposed
on taxpayers by risk-based rules-the cost of incurring market risk.
128 At least, this much is true of a typical (short) waiting period. For such periods,
"the past rates of return on any stock conform closely to a normal distribution."
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 31, at 187. For longer intervals such as one year, the dis-
tribution would be skewed and would better approximate a lognormal distribution. Id.
at 187 n.2.
12 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 246(c) (1) (2000) (forty-five days); id. § 901(k) (fifteen days);
id. § 1091 (a) (thirty days); id. § 1259(c) (3) (sixty days).
130 See, e.g., id. § 246(c); id. § 901 (k), (1).
131 See id. § 1091.
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PCM = RBLI + fi x T
Risk-bearing losses (as well as generic transaction costs) are also
social costs. Pointless transactions, efforts of shelter promoters, and
disutility produced by uncertainty are all real costs to society. No dis-
eases are cured, no inventions made, and no children educated as a
result of these activities. But these are not the only components of the
social cost of imposing market risk. The government also needs to en-
force its rules. This involves audits, litigation, rulemaking, and the
like. 131 I will group all these expenditures under the rubric of en-
forcement costs (ECM). The expected tax liability, on the other hand,
is not a social cost. It is merely an expected transfer from the tax
planner to the government (that is, other members of society). This
transfer does not affect the overall social welfare. Thus, the total so-
cial cost of deterring tax planning with market-risk-imposing rules is:
S(Q = RBLM + EC
B. Business Risk
Business risk is similar to market risk in many respects. It pro-
duces risk-bearing losses (RBL) when, for example, taxpayers con-
tinue to own a business they no longer want (as they must do in the
drop-and-sell scheme) or operate without the protection of the corpo-
rate veil (as they sometimes did in the liquidation-reincorporation
structure). Enforcement costs of tax planning are also comparable for
market and business risks. The same is true of the likelihood that the
tax planning strategy will fail (that is, 6,M is generally equal to fiB).
There is, however, an important difference between the two types of
uncertainty.
Incurring business risk means accepting a chance that the busi-
ness contingency will be resolved in favor of, or against, the taxpayer.
Unlike in the market risk case, however, the expected gain and loss
are no longer offsetting. The liquidation-reincorporation sequence
provides the most intuitive example. Business risk arises here because
the taxpayer loses the protection of limited liability while she operates
the business outside of corporate form. While this may lead to some
savings, the net effect is clearly negative. It is also entirely unrelated
132 For a detailed discussion of enforcement and other costs, see Joel Slemrod &
Shlomo Yitzhaki, Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration, in 3 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 1423, 1447-49 (AlanJ. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 2002).
133 The cost of losing limited liability was recognized by several courts. See cases
cited supra note 58.
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to risk bearing. In other words, even a risk-neutral taxpayer who
never incurs risk-bearing losses will view a loss of a corporate veil as an
expected cost. In contrast, a risk-neutral tax planner will remain en-
tirely unaffected by market-risk-imposing rules. Thus, it is appropriate
to include an additional variable into the private cost of incurring
business risk-the expected (net) loss from the adverse resolution of a
business contingency, or, in short, the expected business loss. This loss
may be expressed as a, x LB, where aB is the probability that the tax-
payer will incur a business loss equal to LB.
It may appear that this loss is absent in many business risk situa-
tions. In a drop-and-sell scenario, for example, a taxpayer must retain
the business she no longer wants after it is incorporated. Here the
protection of the corporate veil is gained, not lost. Yet even in this
case the taxpayer incurs the expected business loss. Quite simply, if
she valued limited liability highly enough, she would have incorpo-
rated the business long ago. Whatever her reasons were for not doing
so, they made it worthwhile not to incorporate.14 It follows that in-
corporating is an undesirable move, which is the same as saying that
the taxpayer incurs an expected loss from making it. That loss, again,
is wholly separate from the unwanted continuing exposure to the risk
of the business that is needed to satisfy the "immediately after the ex-
change" requirement (i.e., that loss is different than RBL5 ). Granted,
in some cases the expected business loss may be zero. Yet in many
transactions involving business risk there is clearly a loss. Thus, on av-
erage, the expected business loss is an additional cost incurred by tax-
payers planning around business-risk-imposing rules. Therefore, the
private cost of incurring business risk (PC,) may be summarized as:
PC = RBLB + a. x L. + B x T
Does the expected business loss enter the social cost calculus as
well? It does not. Whenever this loss materializes-say a liquidator-
reincorporator has to pay a tort judgment out of personal assets be-
cause she operated her business in an unincorporated form-this
payment is merely a transfer between two members of society. What-
ever the tax planner loses, the tort victim gains. The transfer has no
effect on overall social welfare. Therefore, the social cost of imposing
business risk is, for our purposes, the sum of risk-bearing losses and
1 Of course, the same argument applies to a taxpayer undertaking a liquidation-
reincorporation sequence.
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the enforcement cost of business-risk-imposing rules (ECB), and it does
not include the expected business loss: 135
SC = RBLB + EC
Needless to say, the picture can be easily made more complex.
Continuing with the liquidator-reincorporator/tort victim example,
the payment from one party to the other may affect social welfare for
a variety of reasons. The marginal utility of the amount transferred
may be higher (or lower) to the taxpayer than to the tort victim be-
cause, for instance, they have different wealth. The parties may have
different utility functions. The social welfare function may assign dif-
ferent weights to utilities of the two individuals involved. Countless
other objections may be made. 36 The same can be said of the earlier
discussion of market risk and the following discussion of counterparty
risk. While I will not deal with these complications here, they are
clearly important. My goal, however, is to lay the groundwork. I will
eschew additional complexity in order not to obscure the basic dis-
tinctions.
C. Counterparty Risk
Tax planners may reduce their taxes while incurring market or
business risk in complete solitude. Relational tax planning, in con-
trast, requires cooperation. The Taxpayer must take a leap of faith
and rely on the Counterparty, who will have a chance to reciprocate
or betray the Taxpayer's trust. Either outcome will have conse-
quences for both parties.
1. Private Benefits of Cooperation
Assume, first, that the Counterparty cooperates. His trustworthy
behavior increases the Taxpayer's trust in the Counterparty.13
Stronger trust has potentially broad implications for the entire rela-
tionship between these two transactors. As Kenneth Arrow observed,
135 It also does not include the expected tax liability for the same reason this liabil-
ity is excluded from the social cost of market risk.
l3 For instance, one may argue that the mode of analysis that relies on utility and
social welfare functions is inappropriate in the first place.
137 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1491 (2005)
("'[V]oluntarily risking vulnerability... promote[s] the attribution of trustworthi-
ness,'" while "[e]xposing oneself to risk... provides a prime mechanism for initiating
trust." (quoting Svenn Lindstold, Trust Development, the GRIT Proposal, and the Effects of
Conciliatory Acts on Conflict and Cooperation, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL. 772, 789 (1978))).
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"Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of
trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. " '
While another noted economist, Oliver Williamson, argued that it is
misleading to use the term "trust" in describing commercial relation-
ships, 139 numerous scholars have pointed out a variety of ways in which
trust (or, if one prefers, willingness to accept a risk of relying on a
contractual counterparty) facilitates commercial exchanges.
Trust, they have argued, signals contractual flexibility, 40 conserves
cognitive resources, speeds up decision making, 4 facilitates searches
143 144
for reliable business partners, reduces monitoring costs, lessens un-
certainty and expense ofjudicial enforcement, 145 enhances transfer and
credibility of private information,146 diminishes the need for contin-
gency planning and insurance, 147 and "creates opportunities for the ex-
change of goods and services that are difficult to price or enforce" using
formal agreements."s In sum, all sorts of transaction costs are reduced
if the transactors trust each other. It is also widely accepted that trust
grows with use.1 49 Each act of reliance and each instance of trustworthy
behavior strengthen mutual confidence.' 50
138 KennethJ. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 (1972).
139 See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, 36J.L.
& ECON. 453, 463 (1993) (introducing the term "calculative trust" and explaining why
it is "a contradiction in terms").
140 See G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Con-
tracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 255 (1991).
141 See Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox
ofEmbeddedness, ADMIN. SCI. Q., Mar. 1997, at 35, 43.
142 See id.
143 See Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for
Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 AcAD. MGMT. J. 85, 107 (1995).
144 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1757 (2001).
145 See id.
146 See Brian Uzzi, Embeddedness in the Making of Financial Capital: How Social Rela-
tions and Networks Benefit Firms Seeking Financing, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 481, 490 (1999).
147 See Larry T. Garvin, Credit, Information, and Trust in the Law of Sales: The Credit
Seller's Right of Reclamation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 247, 34142 (1996).
148 Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Perform-
ance of Organizations: The Network Effect, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 674, 677 (1996).
149 See, e.g., Garvin, supra note 147, at 342 (citing Albert 0. Hirschman, Against Par-
simony: Three Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories of Economic Discourse, 74 AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 89, 93 (1984)); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of
Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 600 (2001).
" See, e.g., Gulati, supra note 143, at 94 (citing Aravind Parkhe, Strategic Alliance
Structuring: A Came Theoretic and Transaction Cost Examination of Interfirm Cooperation, 36
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Successful relational tax planning makes the Taxpayer and the
Counterparty better cooperators. If these parties have a multifaceted
business relationship, a resulting incremental increase in trust facili-
tates their transactions other than the one in which the Taxpayer incurs
counterparty risk as a cost of gaining a tax benefit. Granted, trust may
affect some aspects of a relationship, while not extending to others.15
Trusting the Counterparty to hold the Taxpayer's loss security for a
month is not the same as relying on him to take care of the Taxpayer's
child for the same period. Yet there is no reason to think that incre-
mental trust generated by relational tax planning has zero spillover
effects. Transactors are likely to view tax planning (at least as long as
it is not overly aggressive) as just another cost-saving device. If so, co-
operation enhanced by the specific relational tax planning episode
will often extend to other informal interactions between the Taxpayer
and the Counterparty.
These interactions, to be sure, may be bad for society. If relational
tax planning makes the Taxpayer and the Counterparty better "part-
ners in crime," it produces a unique social cost. This is a crucial ques-
tion that will be addressed in detail below. The discussion here fo-
cuses on private benefits of relational tax planning. And these benefits
are clearly positive, at least as long as the Counterparty cooperates.
2. Private Costs and Benefits of Defection
What if the Counterparty defects? Any rational Taxpayer will, no
doubt, ask herself this question before engaging in relational tax
planning. There is always a chance (a,) that the Counterparty will be-
tray the Taxpayer's trust and the Taxpayer will incur a loss (L,). Does
the expected counterparty loss (a, x L,) enter the Taxpayer's cost-benefit
calculus in the same way as the expected business loss (aB x L5 ) does
for those who incur business risk?
The answer is no, because of the unique nature of counterparty
risk. In the business risk case, the tax planner can do nothing to in-
fluence the unknown future recipient of the amount LB. Until the ad-
verse business contingency is resolved, there is no one with whom to
negotiate. Not so for counterparty risk. It arises from a Coasean bar-
gain between two parties. In the absence of transaction costs (I will
ACAD. MGMT. J. 794 (1993), for the proposition that a history of cooperation reduces
perceptions of expected opportunistic behavior).
' See, e.g., Cross, supra note 137, at 1503 (arguing that trust is multidimensional,
meaning that a relationship may contain both trust and distrust).
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consider them later), these parties will strike a deal whenever there is
a surplus to be shared. The joint (private) surplus of relational tax
planning is the excess of the Taxpayer's tax benefit over her risk-
152bearing loss from incurring counterparty risk (RBLC). The ex-
pected counterparty loss (a, x L,) does not enter the equation be-
cause, under perfect bargaining conditions, the Counterparty will al-
ways reimburse the Taxpayer for accepting that cost. For instance, at
the margin (when the joint surplus is very small, say, $1), the Coun-
terparty will be willing to make an up-front payment to compensate
the Taxpayer for incurring the expected counterparty loss, as long as
the Counterparty derives some net benefit from this trade.15 3 That is,
the Counterparty will surrender the expected gain from his possible
defection in order to induce the Taxpayer to go forward with rela-
tional tax planning and share with the Counterparty a portion of the
joint surplus (say, $0.50). Therefore, the expected loss from the
Counterparty's defection will be fully taken into account by the Tax-
payer ex ante, yet it will not amount to the additional private cost and
will not affect decisions of marginal Taxpayers. 
154
152 More precisely, this joint surplus also includes the cooperation gain, see infra
text accompanying note 162, and is reduced by the tax cost incurred by the Counter-
party, if any.
153 The net benefit is the excess of the expected counterparty loss (a, x L) (which
is a benefit to the Counterparty) over the payment made by the Counterparty to the
Taxpayer at the inception of the trade.
'54 It may appear that this analysis holds only if there is a market for Counterpar-
ties who compete against each other for the Taxpayer's business, eliminating any pos-
sible rents. It is safe to assume that no such market exists, yet the analysis holds. The
market is absent because not all potential Counterparties are the same. The Taxpayer
trusts some a lot, others a little, and many not at all. The stronger the trust, the lower
the probability of defection and risk-bearing loss. (Probability of defection affects a
risk-bearing loss because if the probability is very small (or very large), the expected
income and the certainty equivalent converge. See ROSEN, supra note 8, at 267-69.)
Thus, the Taxpayer will choose the most trusted Counterparty as her relational tax
planning partner. This suggests that the Counterparty is in a position to capture rents
or quasi-rents, depending on the source of trust. (For a distinction between rents and
quasi-rents, see, for example, Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 74, at 298-99.)
The Counterparty, it appears, is like a monopolist who can set the price that the Tax-
payer must pay in order to elicit the Counterparty's cooperation, capturing the
amount equal to the additional cost that the Taxpayer will incur if she has to deal with
a less-trusted partner. Yet the monopoly here is probably bilateral. Intuitively, if the
Counterparty is the Taxpayer's best friend, it is quite likely that the reverse is true as
well. If the Counterparty "overplays" his hand, no other equally trusting Taxpayer is
standing in the wings to replace the one who went elsewhere. If so, the Counterparty's
bargaining power is limited, and he will deal with the Taxpayer even if the benefit cap-
tured by the Counterparty is diminishingly small.
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The Counterparty's defection-unwelcome as it is-will have a sil-
ver lining. The Taxpayer will acquire new information about the
Counterparty's trustworthiness. If the Taxpayer is fully rational and
does not act strategically in a particular way, this additional informa-
tion is a clear private benefit. Assume that the two transactors have
developed a moderate level of trust (say, equal to 10 on some 100-
point reliability scale). Relational tax planning forces the Taxpayer to
place significant reliance on the Counterparty (say, equal to 50). If
the Counterparty defects, all that the Taxpayer learns is that she can-
not trust the Counterparty to that extent. This is useful information
in itself, and it has no effect on the cooperation in the 1 to 10 range.
Of course, the Taxpayer also incurs a loss L,, but that loss was fully
taken into account ex ante.
What if relational tax planning involves a modest reliance (say, of
8) and the Counterparty defects anyway? This will happen only if the
Counterparty's preferences changed or if he acquired new informa-
tion.155 As long as this change is not caused by relational tax plan-
ning-and there is no reason to assume that this will be a typical
case-the Taxpayer would have been betrayed anyway.156 The Coun-
terparty would have defected the next time the Taxpayer relied on the
Counterparty at the same level (of 8) in their non-tax-related informal
dealings. The only consequence of defection during the relational tax
planning episode is that the Taxpayer learned about the preference
change sooner.
The Taxpayer may act strategically, however. For expositional
simplicity, assume that she adopts the "tough guy" strategy and discon-
tinues all informal cooperation with contractual partners who defect
in any respect.!57 This strategy may be rational because it signals to
155 I assume that tax planning is viewed as similar enough to other informal inter-
actions that the level of trust is the same in all these settings. For further discussion,
see infta text accompanying notes 169-170.
156 While a preference change is conceivable, predicting its timing, underlying rea-
sons, and direction remains an extremely challenging task. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott,
The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1605,
1633-37 (2000) (explaining why abandoning a basic assumption of the rational choice
theory-that preferences are exogenous and stable-undermines the theory's capacity
to generate testable hypotheses). Given the pervasive uncertainty surrounding prefer-
ences, there is no reason to assume that their change-if any-is caused by any specific
event, especially one as minor as a relational tax planning episode.
157 An even "tougher" strategy would be to break up the business relationship en-
tirely upon any Counterparty defection. Needless to say, many intermediate strategies
exist. For a much more detailed discussion of retaliatory threats, see SCHELLING, supra
note 75, at 35-43.
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the rest of the world that the cost of betraying the Taxpayer's trust is
higher than average. 15 If the Counterparty defects during a relational
tax planning episode, and if the two have an ongoing business rela-
tionship, gains from the existing informal cooperation will be elimi-
nated-a clear private loss.
Yet this scenario is not particularly likely. A Taxpayer who adopts
an extreme response to even minor defections will not be a part of
many informal relationships.1 59 At the same time, a Counterparty aware
of the Taxpayer's strategy is less likely to defect. Moreover, a rational
Taxpayer would take into account that the signal sent by a "tough guy"
response will be neither clear nor necessarily strong. Parties rarely pub-
licize their relational tax planning. It is also frequently tailored to idio-
syncratic transactions between the parties. Even in an environment
where reputation for reliability is important, the Taxpayer will have a
hard time convincing others what exactly was wrong with the Counter-
party's actions. If so, the "tough guy" response loses its bite. In some
business environments, a general reputation for trustworthiness is not
worth all that much. 6 ° There, again, excessive toughness makes little
sense. In sum, a loss of existing cooperation on account of relational
158 See, e.g., id. at 17-18 (explaining why abandoning narrow rationality may be a
superior negotiating strategy); Avery Katz, When Should an Offer Stick? The Economics of
Promissory Estoppel in Preliminary Negotiations, 105 YALE L.J. 1249, 1298 (1996) ("Parties
who can establish a credible reputation for stubbornness, spite, or even irrationality
will increase their bargaining power....").
159 Minor defections (deviations from contract terms or requests for their modifi-
cations) are an everyday occurrence in commercial relationships. The voluminous lit-
erature describing how businesspeople resolve their disputes without resorting to law-
yers and legal arguments provides plenty of evidence that these (relatively minor)
disputes arise all the time. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court:
Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1787-88
(1996); RussellJ. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1,
22 (reporting that on average only 17.1% of respondent firms never ask to modify
their contracts, while over 40% ask to do so at least one to five times a year). Restraint
in responding to a counterparty's defection is a winning strategy. In a prisoner's di-
lemma tournament, a disproportionate reaction to defections made "nice" but "unfor-
giving" strategies less successful than tit-for-tat, a strategy that punishes a defection by
one-and only one-defection of its own. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 35-36 (1984).
160 See, e.g., M. Bensaou & Erin Anderson, Buyer-Supplier Relations in Industrial Mar-
kets: When Do Buyers Risk Making Idiosyncratic Investments?, 10 ORG. SCI. 460, 475-76
(1999) (finding that supplier reputation has no effect on the magnitude of relation-
specific investments reflective of the level of trust in the buyer-supplier relationship);
Uzzi, supra note 148, at 677-80 (noting that in the New York garment industry, general
reputation for reliability plays very little role, while bilateral relationships are extremely
valued).
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tax planning is possible, but its overall magnitude does not appear to be
especially high. Not all Counterparties will defect, not all Taxpayers will
act strategically, not all strategically acting Taxpayers will discontinue
informal cooperation to the same (large) extent, and some of those
who do would have done so anyway.161
What follows from this analysis is somewhat counterintuitive. Tak-
ing into account both the cooperation and defection outcomes, the
Taxpayer stands to derive a unique gain from relational tax planning.
The Counterparty's cooperation strengthens the Taxpayer's trust, al-
lowing the Taxpayer to save on transaction costs in her future dealings
with the Counterparty. The Counterparty's defection reveals new in-
formation about his trustworthiness. While it also imposes a loss on
the Taxpayer, that loss is fully incorporated into the deal between the
two parties ex ante (as the expected counterparty loss a, x L,), so it
does not affect the marginal incentives of relational tax planners. The
net effect of reduced transaction costs and new information is a re-
duced private cost of future informal contracting. I will call this net
benefit to the Taxpayer the cooperation gain (CG). 162
Yet something appears amiss. If the Taxpayer and the Counter-
party stand to capture the cooperation gain from relational tax plan-
ning, why have they not captured this benefit already? What prevents
contractors from optimizing the level of trust without any tax consid-
erations involved? Is there a unique trust-enhancing effect of incur-
ring counterparty risk?
161 If the Taxpayer responds irrationally, all bets are off. The most intuitive reac-
tion is revenge and loss of the existing benefits of informal cooperation. But an irra-
tional Taxpayer may draw exactly the opposite conclusion. She may decide, for exam-
ple, that once the Counterparty betrayed her at a reliance level of 50, he is less likely to
do so again. Predicting reactions of irrational individuals is impossible, which, no
doubt, is why economics largely shies away from doing so.
162 The Counterparty is also likely to benefit from the Taxpayer's decision to en-
gage in relational tax planning, although the Counterparty's gain is likely to be much
smaller. The Taxpayer's decision to rely on the Counterparty reveals the Taxpayer's
trust. But the characteristic that signals reliability and leads to transaction cost savings
is trustworthiness. The Counterparty learns nothing about it from the Taxpayer's trust-
ing behavior, so he derives no direct benefit. Scholars have argued, however, that trust
building takes place through reciprocal acts of trusting. See sources cited supra notes
137, 149. To the extent the Taxpayer's decision to rely on the Counterparty facilitates
the Counterparty's decision to respond in kind, the Taxpayer's reliance indirectly fa-
cilitates trust building. Because this effect is more remote than that considered in the
text, I will ignore it in the remainder of the discussion. This does not change the
analysis. One can simply think of the cooperation gain as being slightly larger than
otherwise to reflect the Counterparty's share.
RELATIONAL TAX PLANNING
To begin with, it is quite clear that the current level of trust be-
tween the vast majority of transactors can be increased. The mere
presence of extensive formal contracts (tax- and non-tax-motivated) is
the best evidence that most business relationships fall far short of the
absolute trust benchmark.163 Furthermore, the contractors' goal is not
to maximize their trust, but to minimize total contracting costs. 64 In
pursuing it, they take full advantage of contract law to limit opportun-
ism and expand the self-enforcing range of their relationships by
combining formal and informal enforcement. 16 5 This strategy-while
perfectly rational-may well prevent contractors from pursuing trust-
enhancing steps in designing their agreements. 16
Fortunately for contracting parties, contract design-and specifi-
cally, the allocation of certain contractual rights and obligations to the
informal realm-is hardly the only means of trust building. It is
common knowledge that many commercial actors routinely deviate
from the terms of their written agreements. 167 Most of these devia-
tions are relatively minor, to be sure, but they allow the parties to
strengthen their trust without affecting the overall structure of the
contract. 168
163 Formal contracting is expensive, yet the parties incur its cost because trust-
based reliance is even more costly at the margin. With total trust, reliance would be
costless and no formal contracts would exist.
164 See Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur, supra note 74, at 459 n.22 ("[C] ontract terms are
set to minimize real costs (and not hold-ups).").
165 See id. at 449-50.
166 Strong support for this suggestion comes from the story told by Thomas Palay,
discussed in detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 182-195. Palay docu-
mented an extraordinary level of cooperation achieved by some shippers and rail car-
riers who were forced to avoid extremely restrictive regulations imposed under the In-
terstate Commerce Act. As soon as the rail industry was deregulated, however,
shippers and carriers who had been doing business without any formal documentation
started documenting (some of) their dealings. Thus, even for the parties that had al-
ready reached a very high level of trust, it was cheaper to formalize some of their con-
tractual relationships, putting less pressure on informal enforcement.
167 For a summary of the literature, see Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms, supra note
6, at 604-05.
18 Lisa Bernstein and Robert Scott have each argued that contractors have good
reasons to deviate from their formal agreements. See Bernstein, supra note 159, at
1796-98 (positing that contractors follow "relationship-preserving norms" to incorpo-
rate observable but unverifiable information, adapt to different stages in their relation-
ship, simplify written contracts, and so on); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of De-
fault Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 613 (1990) (arguing that
parties follow a more flexible set of rules for informal enforcement in order to over-
come "the inherent limitations of the legal enforcement mechanism"). In fact, Bern-
stein observed that contractors will not strictly follow the letter of their contracts "as
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Another familiar example is businesspeople's penchant for devel-
oping social connections. Personal interactions give transactors yet
another venue to engage in trust building. Embedding business deal-
ings into social networks adds to the range of penalties faced by defec-
tors, making defections less likely. Thus, like minor deviations from
written terms, social relationships are both separate from contract de-
sign (so they do not interfere with the contractors' main objective of
minimizing total contracting costs) and related to contractual rela-
tionships (so that establishing social ties has a beneficial spillover ef-
fect on business cooperation).
Add regulatory avoidance to the list. This is yet another setting
that allows transactors to demonstrate their trustworthiness without
interfering with contract design. In addition, and similarly to social
interactions, cooperative regulatory avoidance introduces a new type
of penalty for defection. If both parties use each other's "services" to
reduce their tax liabilities, a betrayed Taxpayer may tip off the regula-
tor about the Counterparty's earlier aggressive tax positions. 69 More-
over, regulatory avoidance is even more closely related to commercial
dealings than social interactions are because it is so clearly profit
driven. Thus, because it is qualitatively different from other trust-
enhancing strategies, relational regulatory avoidance may indeed have
no substitutes. 170
long as they continue to trust one another and/or value potential future dealings."
Bernstein, supra note 159, at 1796 (emphasis added). My suggestion is that parties do
this in order to continue to develop their mutual trust, or, in Schelling's words, to cre-
ate a "tradition of trust." SCHELLING, supra note 75, at 45.
169 The Taxpayer will have no incentive to describe the very strategy where she was
betrayed because in that case the Taxpayer is the one relying on relational tax planning.
170 An alternative hypothesis is that once a Taxpayer requests Counterparty's assis-
tance in skirting the tax rules, the Counterparty will view the Taxpayer as a less reliable
business partner. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance,
86 VA. L. REv. 1781, 1789-90 (2000). For a rebuttal, see Russell Hardin, Law and Social
Norms in the Large, 86 VA. L. REV. 1821, 1822-24 (2000). Hardin's view seems more per-
suasive. It is also supported by empirical data. Moreover, in contrast with Posner's
model, which focuses on taxpayers who fail to comply with tax law, some relational tax
planning strategies are almost certainly legal. After all, numerous relational tax plan-
ners won in court.
Another distinctive trust-building benefit of relational tax planning is that it may
produce a nonreplicable combination of benefits and payoffs. The private benefit at
stake-the tax savings-is an artificial gain produced by a regulatory regime. As long
as costs and benefits of informal business-related cooperation do not vary continuously
(and there is no reason to expect that they always do), relational tax planning may pro-
vide a cost-benefit combination that is not available to the parties otherwise. To take
just one example, the net tax benefit may simply be larger than any net private gain
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In addition, in some settings a tax benefit may tip the scale in fa-
vor of cooperation. Generally, whenever the expected non-tax-related
gain from cooperation falls short of the expected cost of the counter-
party defection, relational contracting fizzles. But if the transaction
also gives rise to a tax benefit that exceeds this shortfall, cooperation
becomes worthwhile. Tax savings, that is, may be just what the Tax-
payer needs to take a plunge. For all these reasons, relational tax
planning may play a crucial and unique role in the creation-and sig-
nificant expansion-of cooperative relationships.
3. Additional Private Costs of Relational Tax Planning
Similarly to those who incur market and business risks, relational
tax planners face a risk-bearing loss (RBLC) and the expected tax li-
ability (fl, x T). In contrast with market- and business-risk-bearing
taxpayers, relational tax planners face a unique complication. Con-
tract scholars have long recognized that strategic behavior and asym-
metric information give rise to two different types of costs. First, con-
tractors consume resources directly. They hire lawyers, search for
information that is known to the other side, delay efficient invest-
ments, and so on. 17 These are the familiar generic transaction costs.
In addition, parties occasionally fail to reach agreements that would
have made both sides better off. 172 They leave gains from trade on the
table because they cannot overcome bargaining problems. Some-
times, a bargaining failure occurs after a negotiation has begun. On
other occasions, a mere anticipation of a bargaining failure prevents a
negotiation from ever taking place.
For a contract theorist, the distinction between these two types of
costs is unimportant-both reduce the efficiency of private contract-
ing. But for our purposes, the distinction is critical. Challenges of
opportunistic bargaining are encountered only by relational tax plan-
ners. Taxpayers who face market and business risks avoid these prob-
lems entirely because they have no one to bargain with. The cost of
failing (due to imperfect bargaining) to capture some of the private
that would arise from non-tax-motivated informal cooperation. More generally, the
tax planning benefit will just be different.
71 See CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION, supra note 94, at 7; Wil-
liamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 75, at 242 (referring to "costly hag-
gling").
17 See CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION, supra note 94, at 7; Wil-
liamson, Transaction-Cost Economics, supra note 75, at 242 (referring to "efficient adapta-
tions" that are not pursued due to strategic bargaining problems).
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gains available to relational tax planners is a unique attribute of coun-
173terparty risk. I will call it the bargaining cost (BC). We can finally
summarize the total private cost of incurring counterparty risk:
PC, = RBLc + & x T+ BC- CG
In sum, the cooperation gain makes accepting counterparty risk
relatively cheaper, while the bargaining cost makes it relatively more
expensive than incurring market risk.
4. Social Costs and Benefits of Relational Tax Planning
As with other types of uncertainty, risk-bearing losses accompany-
ing counterparty risk enter both the private and social cost calcula-
tions. Whether the cooperation gain and the bargaining cost do the
same is more complicated. But before addressing these complexities,
it is worth pointing out something that is fairly clear. The enforce-
ment costs of imposing counterparty risk (ECc) are significantly higher
than ECM and ECB. This is because defining, finding, and prosecuting
relational tax planning is particularly difficult, as discussed in Part III.
For the same reason, the expected tax liability of counterparty risk
(tic x T) is smaller than expected tax liabilities arising from market
and business risks.
The manner in which the cooperation gain enters the social cost
equation depends on the nature of transactions between the Taxpayer
and the Counterparty other than the one generating the tax savings.
If all other transactions are tax avoidance (or, worse yet, evasion), the
enhanced trust makes the two parties better "partners in crime."
1 7 4
The (private) cooperation gain reduces social welfare.175 If, on the
other hand, all other interactions are not tax motivated, the coopera-
tion gain produces a true social surplus because efficient behavior is
173 For a similar use of the term, see R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE
LAw 6 (1988).
174 In addition, cooperation strengthened by relational tax planning may lead to
more avoidance of non-tax regulatory regimes. The magnitude of such carryover ef-
fect need not be large, however. There is no clear evidence, for instance, that the U.S.
manufacturers who formed successful export cartels also colluded to fix prices in do-
mestic markets, even though this kind of carryover is much easier (one would think)
than the one just discussed, and even though enforcement in this area has not been
particularly strong. See Andrew R. Dick, When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?, 39 J.L. &
ECON. 241, 247-48 (1996) [hereinafter Dick, Stable Contracts].
175 That is, the cooperation gain should be added to other costs in the social cost
equation.
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facilitated by stronger trust. 176 If other interactions involve some of
both, it is unclear whether the cooperation gain is a social cost or so-
cial benefit. What is the more likely outcome?
No doubt, the "partners in crime" scenario is a distinct possibility.
Perhaps it is the first thing that comes to mind. And it is often true. Is
it not crystal clear that the (private) cooperation gain is a significant
social cost?
Not necessarily. Overwhelming evidence suggests that informal
commitments are integral to many (perhaps most) business relation-
ships. While this is certainly true of small entrepreneurs who rely on
unenforceable promises of their local suppliers and customers, 177 even
large companies and sophisticated transactors enter into relational
contracts all the time. 7 8  Studies of these interactions demonstrate
convincingly that combining formal and informal enforcement in-
creases the value of contractual relationships, benefiting the specific
contractors and the society as a whole.7 9 Stronger trust reduces the
transaction costs of relational contracting, magnifying these socially
desirable effects.
176 In this case, the cooperation gain should be subtracted from other costs in the
social cost equation.
177 See, e.g., James A. Wilson, Adaptation to Uncertainty and Small Numbers Exchange:
The New England Fresh Fish Market, 11 BELLJ. ECON. 491 (1980) (a study of fresh water
fishermen); Comment, The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A Re-Appraisal
in Light of Prevailing Practices, 66 YALE L.J. 1038 (1957) (a study of Connecticut manu-
facturers).
178 See, e.g., MARK CAREY ET AL., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM, THE ECONOMICS OF THE PRIVATE PLACEMENT MARKET, 4-5 (1993) (a study of
the private placement debt market); Scott E. Masten & Edward A. Snyder, United
States Versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits, 36J.L. & ECON. 33,
56-64 (1993) (a study of the shoe-making machine manufacturers and users); Wein-
traub, supra note 159 (a study of a diverse sample of U.S. companies).
Relational contracting allows parties to better respond to uncertainty and in-
formation asymmetries, see Simon Deakin et al., "Trust" or Law? Towards an Integrated
Theory of Contractual Relations Between Firms, 21J.L. SOC'Y 329, 333 (1994); act upon in-
formation that is observable (i.e., possible and worthwhile for transactors to obtain)
but not verifiable (i.e., not worthwhile for them to prove to a neutral arbiter in the
event of a dispute), see Bernstein, supra note 159, at 1791-92; Robert E. Scott, The Case
for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 862 (2000); enforce interior
contractual provisions whose violation, while costly, is not harmful enough to justify
bringing a law suit, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Cre-
ating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1761
(2001); David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REV.
373, 394-95 (1990); and more broadly, expand the self-enforcing range of their con-
tractual relationships, see Klein, Why Hold-ups Occur, supra note 74, at 455-56.
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But what does this have to do with relational tax planning? Is
there any reason to think that extra trust generated in the process of
reducing one's taxes carries over to other, non-tax-related aspects of a
commercial relationship? Admittedly, evidence of such a spillover ef-
fect is limited and anecdotal. Yet casual empiricism may be the best
we can do in this area. I suspect that no database contains detailed
quantifiable evidence of informal regulatory avoidance, so economet-
ric analysis is likely to be out of the question. 18 Efforts to conduct
case studies are constrained by the subjects' reluctance to divulge in-
formation about tacit understandings that may come close to violating
legal rules."" Recognizing these severe limitations, I draw on the fol-
lowing examples not to prove the existence of the trust-enhancing as-
pect of relational tax planning, but to suggest its plausibility.
Thomas Palay made what appears to be the single largest contri-
bution to our understanding of the cooperation effects of regulatory
avoidance. In a series of detailed interviews, he learned how rail-
freight carriers (major railroads) and shippers (large manufacturing
companies) "altered" the regulatory regime established by the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC)." s  Whether because Palay as-
sured his subjects of complete confidentiality, 18 because he managed
to talk to businesspeople without getting the public affairs offices in-
180 Only when informal cooperation has macroeconomic effects (such as price
changes for particular goods or services) can it be inferred based on econometric
analysis. See, e.g., Gareth R. Jones & Michael W. Oustay, Interorganizational Coordination
in the Airline Industry, 1925-1938: A Transaction Cost Approach, 14 J. MGMT. 529, 535
(1988) (inferring informal cooperation from the differences between the starting and
final prices in airmail route auctions).
181 See Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail
Freight Contracting, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 266-67 (1984) [hereinafter Palay, Rail Freight
Contracting] (reporting the difficulties of obtaining information about informal coop-
eration designed to escape the constraints of the Interstate Commerce Act). Because
commercial actors are much more forthcoming about violating the terms of their pri-
vate agreements, this phenomenon is much better understood. See, e.g., Bernstein, su-
pra note 159, at 1799 (explaining that cotton traders routinely violate the terms of
their contracts governing the use of weights); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Rela-
tions in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (reporting that
entrepreneurs view contract cancellations not as contractual breaches, but as an ordi-
nary part of buyer-seller relationships); Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The
Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 719,
725 (1973) (describing how jobbers and union representatives "regularly" accede to
violations of the union contract).
182 See Thomas M. Palay, Avoiding Regulatory Constraints: Contracting Safeguards and
the Role of Informal Agreements, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 155, 156-57 (1985) [hereinafter
Palay, Avoiding Constraints].
183 See id. at 156 n.2.
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volved,' 4s or because the regulatory regime that the companies
learned to skirt was about to fall in any case,s 5 the interviewees pro-
vided Palay with a surprisingly detailed account of their regulatory
avoidance.
The ICC regulations faced by Palay's subjects were extremely re-
strictive at the time. They prohibited shippers and carriers from en-
tering into long-term contracts, establishing price incentives, setting
service standards, or making volume commitments. 18 For some
manufacturers and railroads, it was simply impossible to conduct busi-
ness in full compliance with the ICC rules."8 7 These transactors en-
tered into informal, mostly oral, and clearly unenforceable agree-
ments that avoided some (and often most) of the enumerated
limitations."'8 Once the parties were forced to rely on each other to
get around the regulations, they developed mutual trust, achieving a
remarkable degree of cooperation. They invested millions of dollars
based solely on oral assurances.1s9 One auto manufacturer kept its
promise and paid the rail carrier over $1 million without any legal ob-
ligation to do so.' 9° As importantly, strong trust built in interactions
such as these extended to the aspects of relationships that had noth-
ing to do with regulatory avoidance. For instance, shippers and carri-
ers exchanged highly proprietary business projections, routinely
184 In fact, the subjects' willingness to talk without involving the public affairs de-
partment was one of Palay's selection criteria. See id.
185 Palay conducted his interviews between October and December of 1979. Id.
Deregulation was very much in the air at that time. The airline industry had already
been deregulated in 1978. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92
Stat. 1705. Congress was considering an influential report describing the severe prob-
lems of the rail freight industry under the existing regulatory scheme. SeeJames M.
Macdonald & Linda C. Cavalluzzo, Railroad Deregulation: Pricing Reforms, Shipper Re-
sponses, and the Effects on Labor, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 80, 80 (1996). The ICC was
reversing its restrictive regulatory stands. See Palay, Avoiding Constraints, supra note 182,
at 158 n.4. The Staggers Act that deregulated the railroad industry was adopted in
1980, and it was likely being actively discussed in late 1979. See Staggers Rail Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895.
186 See Palay, Avoiding Constraints, supra note 182, at 157-58, 162.
187 This was the case when one of the parties had to make a large transaction-
specific investment, such as when a carrier needed to construct auto racks that could
carry only the cars made by a particular manufacturer, see id. at 161, or when a shipper
had to build a plant that could be serviced only by a specific railroad, see id. at 160.
88 See Palay, Rail Freight Contracting, supra note 181, at 276-77. "[These] informal
contracts provided a vehicle for adjusting contract prices or values even where the [In-
terstate Commerce Act] prohibited such practices." Palay, Avoiding Constraints, supra
note 182, at 168.
189 Palay, Rail Freight Contracting, supra note 181, at 277.
190 Id at 276.
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agreed to adjust their informal understandings, and made unilateral
(and costly) investments to accommodate the counterparty's idiosyn-
cratic preferences) 9'
Can we be sure that it was regulatory avoidance that facilitated
broader cooperation and not vice versa?'92 Two observations suggest
(while by no means prove) that this was the case. First, the ICC regu-
lations presented no problem for some shippers and carriers.' 93
These transactors did not need to engage in regulatory avoidance.
They also did not appear to develop broader trust-based relationships
similar to those built by shippers and carriers for whom escaping the
ICC regime was a necessity. Thus, there is no reason to conclude that
it was the general preference of all shippers and carriers to do busi-
ness informally. Quite the contrary, extensive relational contracting
emerged only alongside regulatory avoidance. Second, once the in-
dustry was deregulated, many provisions that were part of tacit under-
standings became incorporated into express written agreements.19
The earlier custom of keeping these understandings informal, there-
fore, was not caused by these parties' general dislike of all formalities.
Rather, it was the need to circumvent the ICC regulations that led to
informal contracting."" The resulting trust benefited the entire rela-
tionship.
While Palay's story is the most detailed account of how regulatory
avoidance facilitated broader commercial cooperation, other exam-
ples suggest that the two may be mutually reinforcing. For instance,
when commercial banks and municipal bond dealers participating in
the repo market encountered a regulatory problem, they responded
by switching from formal to informal enforcement for the repurchase
part of the trade." 6 Perhaps there was already some level of trust
191 Id. at 277, 282, 285-86.
192 Causation could run in the opposite direction: because these transactors had a
strong cooperative relationship, they were able to successfully "alter" the unfavorable
regulatory regime once the need to do so arose.
193 See Palay, Avoiding Constraints, supra note 182, at 159-60 (providing examples of
a shipper that could use any of three rail carriers and a carrier whose cars could be
used to transport bulk items of several shippers).
194 See Laurence T. Phillips, Contractual Relationships in the Deregulated Transportation
Marketplace, 34 J.L. & ECON. 535, 544-45, 558 (1991) (referring to thousands of long-
term contracts filed with the ICC after the 1980 deregulation that contain price escala-
tors, individualized rates, and service level guarantees).
195 This appears to have been Palay's view as well. See Palay, Avoiding Constraints,
supra note 182, at 167-68.
,96 See Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms, supra note 6, at 628-29.
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among the market participants, although it could hardly be high given
that the market was just developing. 1 7 On the other hand, informal
cooperation needed to solve the regulatory problem likely contrib-
uted to the fact that the money market has been described for dec-
ades as an environment "in which people say, 'My word is my bond,'
and mean it." '"
Modem financial markets exhibit similar features. Elsewhere, I
described how financial institutions and hedge funds use contractual
norms to produce considerable tax savings.0 Yet the same transac-
tors rely on informal cooperation to capture the benefits of financial
innovation that are completely unrelated to tax.200 In fact, they have
done so for years.20' A similar story may be told about other commer-• 2 0 2
cial environments.
The emerging picture, therefore, is more complex than it might
have initially appeared. Clearly, relational tax planning may produce
197 The repo market developed in the 1910s and 1920s. See STIGUM, supra note 81,
at 81-87. The regulatory problem arose in 1922. See First Nat'l Bank in Wichita v.
Comm'r, 19 B.T.A. 744, 745 (1930).
198 STIGUM, supra note 81, at 218; see also id. at 3-4, 193-96 (explaining that for dec-
ades, the repo market was highly informal and was an integral part of the intercon-
nected money market, which strongly valued trustworthiness).
199 See Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms, supra note 6, at 616-18.
200 See id. at 622-25.
201 See id. at 680.
202 The motion picture distribution industry is one example. From its early days,
film distributors and exhibitors supplemented their written agreements with an im-
plicit understanding-a combination that maximized the surplus shared by the parties.
See Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Enforcing Film
Contracts, 43 J.L. & ECON. 427, 430-32 (2000) [hereinafter Kenney & Klein, Self-
Enforcing Film Contracts] (describing an informal understanding among motion picture
distributors and exhibitors that allowed exhibitors to replace underperforming films).
When the Department ofJustice intervened and forced the distributors to accept new
ways of marketing their movies, little changed in practice. Industry participants defied
the unwanted requirements through a different kind of informal cooperation. See Roy
W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26J.L. & ECON. 497, 519
(1983) (describing how distributors almost never attended showings even though this
was a valuable right conferred on them by the consent decree negotiated by the Justice
Department). Even after the Supreme Court fundamentally changed the formal rights
and obligations of the industry participants, they developed yet another unenforceable
norm that allowed the business to continue largely unchanged. See Kenney & Klein,
Self-Enforcing Film Contracts, supra, at 433-34 (describing the legal changes and the new
informal understanding, and arguing that, as a result of adopting the new custom, film
license fees as a percentage of admission revenue remained largely unchanged). This
new implicit understanding has survived for at least five decades. See id. at 434. Thus,
distributors and exhibitors succeeded in fostering informal cooperation whether it
made sense based on the business realities or was needed to circumvent legal con-
straints.
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social harm by facilitating more of the same. On the other hand, so-
cially beneficial informal cooperation is pervasive, and some evidence
suggests that it may be generated-or reinforced-by regulatory
avoidance. On balance, it is far from clear whether the total eco-
nomic loss from socially harmful relational tax planning exceeds the
overall welfare gain from the socially beneficial relational contracting
that this tax planning facilitates. In light of this uncertainty, I will as-
sume that socially positive and negative effects of relational tax plan-
ning roughly offset one another. If so, the cooperation gain does not
enter the social cost calculus.
Taking the cooperation gain out of the equation helps evaluate
the social welfare effect of the bargaining cost. This cost reflects a
possible failure of strategic negotiations. When this failure occurs, the
Taxpayer and the Counterparty do not engage in relational tax plan-
ning even though its private benefit exceeds its private cost. When-
ever this happens, society benefits because deadweight loss of tax
planning does not materialize.203 No risk-bearing losses are incurred;
no generic transaction costs are wasted. To be sure, the cooperation
gain also disappears. But because it is excluded from the social cost
calculation, this makes no difference. Thus, society loses nothing
when imperfect bargaining precludes relational tax planning. In con-
trast to similar losses incurred by non-tax-motivated commercial ac-
tors, the bargaining cost is a private, but not a social, loss. Therefore,
the social cost of incurring counterparty risk may be expressed as:
SCc = RBL, + EC,
D. Multilateral Counterparty Risk
As with market, business, and counterparty risks, multilateral risk
stops some taxpayers from engaging in wasteful tax planning and im-
poses risk-bearing losses on those who remain undeterred. Like coun-
terparty risk (but not market risk), multilateral risk produces the co-
operation gain and bargaining cost. Unlike any other type of risk,
multilateral risk gives rise to an externality. This externality has two
distinct components, and it makes sense to consider them separately.
First, when interactions take place in a norm environment, they are
observed by other group members. Each act of Taxpayer/Counterparty
203 The magnitude of these losses, it is worth remembering, is not equal to the size
of the tax savings. For a discussion, see Louis Kaplow, How Tax Complexity and Enforce-
ment Affect the Equity and Efficiency of the Income Tax, 49 NAT'L TAXJ. 135, 13940 (1996).
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cooperation demonstrates their commitment to the specific coopera-
tive norm. As discussed above, this reaffirmation of commitment en-
hances the trust between the transactors involved. In addition-and
this is a unique feature of multilateral risk-the demonstrated com-
mitment to a norm reinforces that norm. A stronger norm makes re-
lying on it less risky for all members of the norm environment. A de-
fection by the Counterparty has the opposite effect.
20 4
If the transaction is a repo, future repurchases by all repo market
participants are more assured each time the two parties follow the
fixed-price repurchase norm. Similarly, all future charitable dona-
tions followed by the specific use of the proceeds by the charities are
less risky each time a donor relies on a charity and the latter cooper-
ates. The two members of a given norm environment who abide by a
particular norm in their dyadic interaction do not take this benefit to
others into account, but policymakers certainly should. I will refer to
it as the specific externality because it is specific to the cooperative norm
used in the exchange that reinforced it.
205
Another externality produced by the Taxpayer/Counterparty inter-
action is less direct but not less important. To the extent that the
members of a given group are engaged in interactions other than the
one involved in the particular Taxpayer/Counterparty exchange,
stronger trust within the group makes all those interactions go more
smoothly as well. Enhanced trust, in short, is not transaction specific.
This is the general externality produced by imposition of multilateral risk.
For instance, if bond dealers who enter into repos with financial
institutions also borrow from them, use their research services, enter
into derivative trades, and so on, all these interactions become easier
(transaction costs decrease) if the specific repo trade reinforces the
level of confidence that in this environment the parties will not de-
204 In a bilateral context, cooperation and defection have similar effects on the
general level of trust in a business environment. However, the link between the ac-
tions of specific transactors and the general atmosphere is much weaker in the absence
of norms. Information is not disseminated nearly as easily and expectations about spe-
cific patterns of behavior are not nearly as well set. Therefore, I have ignored the ex-
ternality in a bilateral setting.
205 Note that unlike the cooperation gain, the specific externality arises even if a
bilateral interaction is a one-shot deal. If a particular donor plans no further gifts to a
given charity, she may well make future gifts to other charities. At the same time, the
particular charity will receive gifts from other donors. All of these interactions will be
made easier (less risky for the donor-Taxpayer) if the charity receiving the gift in ques-
tion cooperates. Thus, as long as there is a group sharing an informal norm, any inter-
action in which group members follow this norm strengthens it, yielding the specific
externality.
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fect.
2° 6 The same is true of family members who co-own a family busi-
ness, and also jointly manage investments, serve as grantors and trus-
tees of various trusts, and engage in other kinds of business relation-
ships.
Both externalities may conceivably strengthen or weaken coopera-
tion. Almost certainly, the former effect prevails. The very existence
of a norm environment means that most of its members cooperate
most of the time. The fact that the Counterparty remains a member
of this environment strongly suggests that, at the very least, he coop-
erates (much) more often than not. Thus, it is safe to assume that on
balance, both externalities reflect additional cooperation.
By definition, externalities do not affect private benefits and
207costs. What are their likely social welfare effects? The specific ex-
ternality facilitates tax avoidance. Elsewhere I have introduced the
term tax-driven norm, defining it as "an informal customary practice
adopted (or persisting) in order to obtain a tax benefit by forgoing
formalization of a particular understanding., 20 8 Tax-driven norms are
especially inefficient. They produce deadweight losses typical of any
tax planning and, in addition, introduce allocative distortions because
economic activity shifts toward environments with many tax-driven
norms.20 9 A Taxpayer who enters into a tax-motivated exchange with a
Counterparty and incurs multilateral risk is relying on a tax-driven
norm. The specific externality makes tax-driven norms stronger. In
the first approximation, a stronger norm leads to more tax-motivated
transactions, but a cost of each transaction declines (due to lower risk
and lower risk-bearing loss). It is difficult to conclude as a general
matter whether a stronger tax-driven norm amounts to a smaller or
larger welfare loss.21°
Evaluating the general externality is also challenging. The analy-
sis turns on the character of norms other than the one used in the
transaction that gives rise to this externality. Not all norms are tax
211driven. Some have no tax effects at all-they are tax neutral . Oth-
ers do have tax consequences, but the reasons for the norms' exis-
206 In fact, this appears to be exactly how the repo norm affected the money mar-
ket in general. See supra text accompanying note 198.
207 See ROSEN, supra note 8, at 81-82.
208 Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms, supra note 6, at 613.
209 See id. at 643-45.
210 Whether the resulting total deadweight loss is larger or smaller depends on the
elasticity of taxpayers' response to the cost of relational tax planning.
See Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms, supra note 6, at 629.
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tence have nothing to do with tax planning. I have called these norms
tax relevant.212 Tax-neutral norms produce no tax-related deadweight• 2 1 3
losses and have many welfare-enhancing effects. Tax-relevant norms
combine some of the inefficiencies of tax-driven norms with some of
214the efficiencies of tax-neutral ones.
Considerable empirical evidence suggests that norm environments
215typically contain numerous individual norms. If most norms in a
given environment are tax neutral, strengthening them is welfare en-
hancing, and the general externality is positive. In contrast, if the norm
environment consists largely of tax-driven norms, the general external-
ity may well be negative. In intermediate cases (and in cases where
most norms are tax relevant), the sign of this externality is uncertain.
What can we take away from this discussion of multilateral risk?
Tax-driven norms are yet another distinctive aspect of relational tax
planning. Evaluating their effect on social welfare, however, is diffi-
cult. Until future research provides us with more information, it
seems misguided to insist that taxpayers' acceptance of multilateral
risk gives rise to a significant overall social cost or benefit. Case-by-
case evaluations may be more informative, as discussed in Part VI.
E. Comparing Risks
We can now evaluate different risks relative to each other. It is fairly
easy to compare market and business risks. Because there is no reason to
assume that the respective expected tax liabilities and enforcement costs
differ systematically and considerably, we may eliminate them from equa-
tions. The simplified private and social costs are as follows:
Market Risk Business Risk
Private Cost RBL, RBL + a, x L
Social Cost RBLI RBLi
This comparison reveals a striking difference. Assume, first, that a
rule imposing market risk is as efficient as an alternative rule that im-
212 See id. at 622-25.
213 See id. at 605-07.
214 Tax-relevant norms are less inefficient than tax-driven ones because they are
not tax motivated. While they produce allocative distortions, they are also likely to give
rise to non-tax-related transaction cost savings typical of many non-tax-driven norms.
For a more detailed discussion, see id. at 645-46.
215 See id. at 673-74.
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poses business risk. This means that the respective social costs, and
216therefore, the risk-bearing losses, are the same. It then follows that
the business-risk-imposing rule is a stronger deterrent, that is, it forces
a would-be tax planner to bear a higher private cost. The expected
211business loss (aB x L) provides additional deterrence. Or we can
turn around and assume that the two rules are equal deterrents (im-
pose equal private costs). If so, the rule imposing business risk is nec-
essarily more efficient because the risk-bearing loss of business risk
(and, therefore, its social cost) is certainly smaller than that of market
risk.21 8 In sum, business risk is a superior policy instrument compared
to market risk. Equally efficient business risk is a stronger deterrent,
and equally deterring business risk is more efficient.
Counterparty risk is more complex than market (and business) risk,
and its components are more uncertain. The respective enforcement
costs certainly differ (with ECc being larger than ECM). The same is
true of the expected tax liabilities (with /ic x T being smaller than iM x
T). Therefore, neither component can be eliminated for comparison
purposes. The bargaining cost increases the private cost of counter-
party risk compared to market risk, and the cooperation gain has the
opposite effect. No general conclusions can be made in the abstract.
These results are summarized in the table below:
Market Risk Counterparty Risk
Private Cost RBLM + iM x T RBLc + c x T+ BC- CG
Social Cost RBLM + ECM RBLC + ECc
Yet the above analysis of counterparty risk is far from pointless.
Although the first-best comparison of market and counterparty risks
that fully takes account of both private and social costs is impossible,
we can make a second-best effort to compare risks of similar magni-
tude, as Part VI demonstrates. Even more can be learned about rela-
tive deterrent effects of counterparty risk incurred by different types
of taxpayers and counterparties. Finally, a first-best comparison is im-
possible only if the current rules are taken as a given. Only under
these rules, for instance, is ECc necessarily higher than ECM. An alter-
native system may change this relationship, not only enabling the
216 That is, RBLM = RBL.
217 If RBLM = RBL, then RBLM < RBL, + a, x LB (given that a. x L2 > 0).
218 If RBLM = RBL, + a, x L,,, then RBL >RBL (given that a, x L, > 0).
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comparison, but possibly demonstrating certain efficiency advantages
of counterparty risk as well. Such an alternative regime is considered
next.
V. ANTICIPATING RELATIONAL TAX PLANNING:
A SWEEPING REFORM
A study of relational tax planning highlights considerable prob-
lems that arise when taxpayers substitute (low) counterparty risk for
(government-calibrated) market risk. Yet, economic analysis suggests
that counterparty risk may be a more or less attractive policy instru-
ment, depending on the resolution of several uncertainties. If we
could disentangle the issue of the risk's magnitude from the question
of its type-if, for example, it were possible to deter tax planners
equally well with either market or counterparty risk-the latter option
may be preferable. This Part argues that it is indeed possible to create
an alternative regime where most taxpayers incur counterparty risk.
Deciding whether such a regime should, in fact, be adopted is more
challenging.
A. Incorporating Relational Tax Planning into Risk-Based Rules
Exposure to market risk is inherent in buying and selling assets and
in choosing a method of financing. No doubt this is why most risk-
based rules are designed to subject taxpayers to market risk. If we view
this connection between the specific kind of risk and the particular na-
ture of the activity protected by a risk-based rule as furthering some
fundamental goal of our tax system, the only appropriate response to
relational tax planning is to impede it. If, however, as this Article sug-
gests, market risk is merely a friction needed to deter tax-motivated be-
havior, there is no reason to assume that it is the only possible one.
Rules designed to impose market risk have been ineffective in combat-
ing relational tax planning. It is worth considering whether changing
the type of friction is a better response than defending the one we cur-
rently have. While back-somersaults are always a possibility, counter-
party risk is the obvious alternative friction to explore.
How can counterparty risk become an adequate friction? Instead of
resisting relational tax planning, the government may consider embrac-
ing it. Rather than designing rules on the assumption of no coopera-
tion among taxpayers and then defending these rules in situations
where cooperation exists, the government can accept the inevitable, so
to speak. If aggressive taxpayers repeatedly (and successfully) circum-
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vent risk-based rules by hidden cooperation, the government can as-
sume that this will take place when it creates the rules in the first
place.2" 9 For waiting-period provisions, this will simply mean longer
waiting periods. Even if many/most taxpayers enter into wash sales with
their friends and business partners (I do not suggest that they currently
do), they can still be forced to bear a significant risk as a price of de-
ducting a loss. All the government needs to do is extend the waiting
period from thirty days to two, three, or even six months. Adjustments
to other risk-based rules would be relatively straightforward as well.
2 0
The friendly wash sale works only as long as the Wash Buyer resells
the loss security for the same price as she paid to purchase it. Except
by accident, the actual price at the time of repurchase will be differ-
ent. Needless to say, the Wash Buyer is under no legal obligation to
resell for the same price. The longer the waiting period, the larger
the possible price fluctuation, the higher the risk of going forward
with the friendly wash sale."'
This example provides a specific illustration of a general point.
Whether the government expects taxpayers to assume counterparty or
market risk, it may be possible to set the magnitude of either risk
(roughly) the same, for instance, by adjusting the waiting periods de-
pending on the type of risk that taxpayers are expected to incur. That
is, the government may recalibrate its risk-based rules by assuming that
taxpayers will engage in relational (rather than traditional) tax plan-
ning.
If the very idea of much longer waiting periods seems outlandish,
consider some existing provisions. Most waiting periods are measured
in days. Some, however, last years. For instance, the waiting period
imposed on a heartless taxpayer who transfers appreciated property to
her dying relative hoping to receive it back as a bequest (and, there-
29 Note that this option is not available as a response to traditional tax planning.
If taxpayers are allowed to hedge, they will eliminate the risk imposed by risk-based
rules completely, making these rules nugatory. The effect will be particularly strong
for financial assets because of a wide availability of hedging techniques.
220 For instance, the constructive sale provision may be strengthened by switching
to the so-called straddle standard, that is, by triggering a constructive sale if a taxpayer
substantially diminishes (rather than eliminates substantially all of) her risk of loss and
opportunity for gain from an appreciated security. The step transaction doctrine may
be strengthened by collapsing the steps unless more uncertainty exists regarding the
later steps when the earlier steps are taken (compared to the current rules).
221 This is so because the price of the loss security in six months may be so high
that the Wash Buyer may defect, betray the friendship, and refuse to resell the security
to the Wash Seller for the original price.
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222
fore, with a "stepped-up" fair market value basis) is one full year. An
even longer waiting period applies to a transaction we have already
considered: a full redemption of the Parent's interest in a family-
controlled business. Congress decided to allow the Parent to treat this
redemption as a tax-favorable stock sale after all, but only if the Parent
agrees to wait for ten years before reacquiring any interest in the re-
deeming corporation! 23 How can these draconian requirements be
explained in light of a thirty-day wait needed to claim a wash sale loss
and many similar rules?
No doubt, the answer is that Congress suspects that informal
norms of family support reduce the real risk incurred by the Parent
and the heartless taxpayer willing to use a dying relative to eliminate a
taxable gain. It is quite clear that admonitions against implicit under-
standings will simply fail in a family setting. Just by virtue of being
family members, taxpayers will convert market risk into counterparty
(here, multilateral) risk and defeat the government's market-risk-
imposing rules. The dramatic ten-year waiting period is an example
of congressional use of the very approach suggested here: Congress
assumed cooperation among close relatives and imposed a waiting pe-
riod based on that assumption. Unlike most other risk-based provi-
sions, these rules were designed to impose counterparty (rather than
market) risk.
Applying the same approach more broadly will yield at least one
significant benefit. Whether risk-based rules are designed with market
224
or counterparty risk in mind, they remain vulnerable to end runs.
The response needed to foreclose these end runs is different, how-
ever. In order for the market-risk-imposing rules to work, they must
be protected by two separate backstop provisions. First, they must be
guarded against excessive risk reduction via formal contracts (hedging
and, occasionally, diversification). Thus, a traditional backstop is needed
to deter traditional tax planning. Second, these rules must deny tax
benefits to those who enter into informal arrangements or under-
standings related to the risk-imposing transaction. This relational back-
I.R.C. § 1014(e) (2000).
223 More precisely, the Parent is allowed to maintain an interest in the redeeming
company, but only as a creditor or if received by bequest or inheritance. See id.
§ 302(c) (2).
224 The analysis for business risk is similar to that for market risk, and I omit it for
brevity.
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stop protects against relational tax planning.225 The existing risk-based
rules need both backstops. But the alternative counterparty-risk-
226imposing regime requires only the traditional one. Because this re-
gime is designed assuming taxpayers' reliance on implicit agreements,
there is no reason to police their existence with the relational back-
stop.
A chance to eliminate the need to define, search for, evaluate, and
prove the existence of tacit understandings is enticing. No matter how
difficult it may be to take formal contracts into account (and these diffi-S .. 227\
culties are painfully familiar ), doing so is much less costly than re-
sponding to equally varying and complex strategies that rely on infor-
mal arrangements. Moreover, traditional backstops actually used
today are significantly more effective than relational ones. The gov-
ernment has plenty of experience in dealing with formal hedging ar-
rangements, even if with mixed success. The government's record of
countering relational tax planning is much less impressive. In sum, the
alternative approach will need only one type of backstop, and this back-
stop will be the more effective of the two already in place. Clearly, the
alternative system will be less expensive to administer.
This is not to say that such a regime is unambiguously preferable
to the status quo. To begin with, extending waiting periods (and in-
creasing the amount of requisite risk by other means, such as a more
demanding application of the step transaction doctrine) will not turn
strangers into friends, it will merely expose them to larger risks. It is
safe to assume that some taxpayers substitute counterparty risk for
market risk today. Whether most do so is much less certain. If the
rules are recalibrated based on the assumption that most taxpayers
225 That is, a relational backstop denies the tax benefit to those who comply with
the letter of the law but have an informal understanding that reduces the intended
degree of risk.
226 This backstop will need to be expanded to incorporate not only enforceable
contracts, but formal ownership structures as well. For instance, relational tax plan-
ning between two wholly owned subsidiaries should clearly not entitle either entity to
claim any tax benefits.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
228 It may appear that implicit agreements simply cannot replicate complex finan-
cial instruments used by taxpayers to hedge market risk. That much is true, but it
proves little. To engage in relational tax planning, taxpayers need not abandon the
realm of formal contracts entirely. They only need to remove a critical term from the
enforceable (and observable) written agreement. Plenty of evidence suggests that tax-
payers have successfully done this on many occasions even where the underlying for-
mal contracts were quite complex. See Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms, supra note 6, at
651-65.
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will respond by engaging in relational tax planning and this assump-
tion turns out to be wrong, these rules will end up subjecting taxpay-
ers to vastly excessive amounts of risk. No enforcement cost savings
will compensate for gross overdeterrence. To assess whether this is
likely to occur, we need to consider more carefully how taxpayers cur-
rently plan around market-risk-imposing rules and how they are likely
to adapt to the proposed change.
B. Excessive Market Risk or More Cooperation?
Taxpayers differ along many dimensions: wealth, intellect, appe-
tite, and so on. The heterogeneity important for our purposes is the
difference in taxpayers' willingness and ability to cooperate.
Let us divide all taxpayers into four categories: three types of tax
planners and innocent taxpayers. Those in the last category (the anal-
ogy to tort law's innocent bystanders intended) engage in no tax
planning, but end up being affected by risk-based rules nonetheless.
For instance, a taxpayer who sells a security at a loss with no intention
to repurchase it, but three weeks later has a true change of heart and
decides to reacquire the security, is an innocent taxpayer. She did not
sell to take a tax loss, but she will be unable to deduct it if she repur-
chases the loss security within the thirty-day waiting period. Innocent
taxpayers are the unintended victims of risk-based rules.
The three categories of tax planners are strong cooperators, weak co-
operators, and loners. The division is purely functional. Assume that
(like many existing provisions) all market-risk-imposing rules have a
relational backstop. This backstop applies only at some threshold of
cooperation. Whatever that threshold is, strong cooperators can cir-.229
cumvent it. Loners are at the opposite extreme: they trust no one
and, therefore, are incapable of engaging in relational tax planning of
229 For instance, the backstop may be relatively weak. It may be triggered only if
taxpayers have a contract that is not legally binding only because it violates some for-
mality (e.g., it lacks consideration or does not comply with the statute of frauds).
Strong cooperators do not need to enter into such contracts to cooperate successfully.
A more robust provision would deny a tax benefit if taxpayers have an explicit agree-
ment, even though it is not specific enough to give rise to a contract. Strong coopera-
tors can transact without reaching such explicit agreements. An even more far-
reaching rule would apply to taxpayers who had any discussions about a particular
transaction at all. Strong cooperators can successfully rely on each other without dis-
cussing specific deals. Thus, strong cooperators are beyond the reach of the relational
backstop.
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any kind. Weak cooperators are the rest of tax planners (probably the
largest group).
How do all these individuals fare under the current risk-based
rules? Loners bear the full brunt of the market-risk-imposing provi-
sions. Additional prohibitions against implicit arrangements are of no
relevance to them because they do not enter into any such arrange-
ments anyway. These taxpayers are either deterred from tax-motivated
transactions or they assume market risk and pay the full price that the
government set for the tax benefits in question. For loners, market-risk-
imposing rules work as intended.
Strong cooperators convert the precalibrated market risk into a
much smaller counterparty risk and reduce their taxes significantly.
They are grossly underdeterred.
Weak cooperators are the group affected by the relational back-
stop. They do cooperate in general, and they could have entered into
some informal arrangements that, even though not legally binding,
would have produced counterparty risk that is smaller than market
risk imposed by the substantive provisions. However, these arrange-
ments are too "strong"-they violate the backstop prohibition against
implicit understandings and, therefore, they are not worth pursu-
ing. 13 As a result, weak cooperators are in the same position as lon-
ers. In sum, the existing regime provides desired deterrence for lon-
ers and weak cooperators and underdeters strong cooperators. Only
strong cooperators are cooperating.
Consider now what would happen if the government adopts the al-
ternative approach and recalibrates risk-based rules assuming that tax-
payers will engage in relational tax planning. The government would
also repeal the relational backstop while retaining the traditional one,
231as well as keeping some of the existing "related party" presumptions.
These changes will affect taxpayers in all four categories.
Innocent taxpayers will clearly suffer. The alternative regime will
"misfire" and impose a burden on these actors much more often.
230 To simplify the discussion, I focus here only on legal issues. Another difference
among taxpayers is their ability to hide aggressive positions. Incorporating that differ-
ence does not alter the analysis. Weak cooperators who are particularly good at hiding
their informal understandings will simply be in the same position (and will act) as
strong cooperators.
231 E.g., I.R.C. § 267(b) (2000); id. § 707(b). These rules will continue to be
needed because even in the alternative regime taxpayers will bear no risk at all in some
cases (such as where the Taxpayer controls the Counterparty), and too little risk in
others (such as in transactions between parents and children).
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Strong cooperators will continue to cooperate. Counterparty risk will
still be smaller than market risk, so cooperation will continue to make
sense. The amount of uncertainty borne by strong cooperators will
change, however. It will now be sufficiently high to create a friction
intended by the rule drafters.
3 2
Loners will face a much larger market risk than they did before.
The only way for these taxpayers to lower their risk will be by entering
into risk-reducing contracts, that is, by hedging. The remaining tradi-
tional backstop will continue to foreclose this response. In all likeli-
hood, the higher market risk will be so great that very few loners will
accept it. Assuming the risk they bore before was optimal, loners willS 233
be now overdeterred.
The new regime will change the behavior of weak cooperators as
well. It will now make sense for them to enter into relatively strong (yet
informal) arrangements. These agreements will not run afoul of the
remaining backstop rule, and they will convert market risk into a lower
counterparty risk. Thus, weak cooperators will start cooperating.
We can now compare how the two regimes affect various tax plan-
ners. Both appropriately deter two categories of taxpayers: loners
and weak cooperators in the first regime; strong and weak cooperators
234in the second. In both regimes, one category is not deterred as in-
tended. In the first, strong cooperators are underdeterred; in the
232 This conclusion may be unduly optimistic. See infra text accompanying notes
237-238.
233 Tax planning may be overdeterred not because (like a polluting widget-making
factory) it is socially beneficial at a certain level, but because at some point the full so-
cial cost of deterring it (a cost that includes risk-bearing and other losses borne by
those who are not deterred) combined with the cost imposed on innocent taxpayers
exceeds the benefit from decreased deadweight losses of tax planning. For a detailed
explanation of why setting expected penalties in excess of external harm produced by
a particular conduct is inefficient, see, for example, Richard Craswell, Deterrence and
Damages: The Multiplier Principle and Its Alternatives, 97 MiCi. L. REV. 2185, 2195 (1999),
and A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Ill
HARV. L. REv. 869, 877-87 (1998). Perhaps because tax noncompliance is widely
viewed as producing no social benefit whatsoever, tax enforcement literature has been
largely unconcerned with the problem of overdeterrence. SeeJoel Slemrod & Shlomo
Yitzhaki, The Cost of Taxation and the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds, 43 INT"L MONE-
TARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 172, 182 (1996) (describing tax evasion models as implying
that it is optimal to prevent all evasion and ignoring the social costs of deterrence).
2 1 am making simplifying assumptions that (i) weak cooperators who enter into
informal, not legally binding agreements reduce counterparty risk to the same degree
as strong cooperators who enter into no agreements at all, and (ii) the marginal bene-
fit from entering into informal agreements for strong cooperators is diminishingly
small (because they already trust each other "fully").
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second, loners are overdeterred. Weak cooperators are the only ones
who bear the intended risk in both regimes. However, they are coop-
erating in the second regime but not the first one. Finally, in the first
regime many loners and weak cooperators incur market risk, while
strong cooperators incur counterparty risk. In the second regime,
very few loners incur market risk while both strong and weak coopera-
tors incur counterparty risk. These conclusions may be summarized
as follows:
Strong Weak Loners
Cooperators Cooperators
Current Underdeterred Appropriately deterred Appropriately deterred
Regime Cooperating Not cooperating Not cooperating
Alternative Appropriately deterred Appropriately deterred Overdeterred
Regime Cooperating Cooperating Not cooperating
What are the implications of this comparison? To start, we can
answer the question posed at the end of the previous Section. The
second regime does more than simply increase market risk. It
changes the type of planning used by weak cooperators from tradi-
tional to relational. As a result, while in the first regime most planners
incur market risk, in the second most assume counterparty risk. By
recalibrating the amount of risk and allowing relational tax planning,
the government can indeed switch from a primarily market-risk-
imposing regime to a primarily counterparty-risk-imposing one.
Whether it should do so depends, at least from the economic perspec-
tive, on whether this switch is likely to be welfare enhancing.
C. Assessing the Recalibrated Risk-Based Rules
Making this evaluation is not easy, primarily because the costs and
benefits of the alternative approach depend on scarce empirical data.
The most obvious impact of the reform is on innocent taxpayers-
those who engage in no tax planning at all. They are plainly worse off
under the second approach because they are much more likely to be
negatively affected by the recalibrated risk-based rules. An innocent
taxpayer who sells a security at a loss with no tax motivations and de-
cides that the company is worth another shot three weeks later needs
to wait only a week if she wants to deduct her loss. If the waiting pe-
riod is extended to six months, the delay is much longer. Further-
more, a chance that this taxpayer would indeed change her mind
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within a month from the original sale is smaller than the likelihood
that she will do so during the following six months. Clearly, longer
waiting periods introduce larger distortions in the behavior of inno-
cent taxpayers.
This is a definite weakness of the alternative regime. The extent
of the problem, however, is uncertain. The relevant factors are evi-
dent. The difference in waiting periods is clearly important, and so is
the number of innocent taxpayers whose transactions would be af-
fected by the longer waiting period but not the shorter one. The so-
cial cost of forcing these taxpayers to wait the extra time is another
pertinent consideration. While these costs are real, it is worth re-
membering that the costs associated with the existing rules that at-
tempt to reach informal understandings are also considerable, both
because these rules are ineffective in deterring relational tax planning
and because they are costly to implement when the government at-
tempts to do so.
Another flaw of the counterparty-risk-imposing regime is that it
overdeters loners. Some of them will incur costs that (by definition)
exceed the social benefit of decreased tax planning.235 This is clearly
inefficient, but it is not obvious whether the resulting welfare loss is
larger or smaller than that of underdeterring strong cooperators un-
der the current rules. Those who believe that the existing state of tax
compliance should be significantly improved (and many do236) may
decide that overdeterrence is preferable to underdeterrence.
Serious questions arise regarding the effectiveness of the alterna-
tive regime. If, for instance, no (reasonable) waiting period will sub-
ject the Wash Seller to counterparty risk that is as significant as the
thirty days' worth of unhedged market risk, the alternative regime is
235 This is so because loners are assumed to be appropriately deterred by the cur-
rent market-risk-imposing rules, and the amount of market risk borne by loners will
necessarily increase following a switch to the alternative regime.
236 See, e.g., George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES 1449,
1449 (2005) ("[A]ny consideration of major tax reform in this country must give pri-
mary consideration to issues of tax compliance and enforcement."). The Government
Accountability Office named tax enforcement as one of its "High Risk Areas." See Allen
Kenney, Tax Enforcement Makes GAO's 2005 List of "High Risk Areas," 106 TAX NOTES
531, 531 (2005) ("Given the broad declines in IRS's enforcement workforce, IRS's de-
creased ability to follow up on suspected noncompliance, the emergence of sophisti-
cated evasion concerns, and the unknown effects of these trends on voluntary compli-
ance, IRS is challenged on virtually all fronts in attempting to ensure that taxpayers
fulfill their obligations." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting U.S. GOV'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN UPDATE 38 (2005), available at http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d05207.pdf)).
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not worth pursuing. A related concern is that it will be difficult for
the government to evaluate the true magnitude of counterparty risk
borne by taxpayers. These problems will loom large if, for example,
certain parties succeed in marketing themselves as "trust intermediar-
ies" who will accommodate relational tax planners for a fee. Or we
may worry that, taking a page from transaction cost economics, rela-
tive strangers will engage in offsetting transactions where each side is
the Taxpayer in one trade and the Counterparty in the other. As a re-
sult, each party may face an immediate economic loss if she defects onS 237
the related trade, making defection less likely. No doubt, many
other schemes designed to reduce counterparty risk will be devised by
creative minds.
Yet it is unclear whether strategies like these will necessarily suc-
ceed. Developing a reputation for the trustworthiness essential to be a
successful trust intermediary will take time and effort, and this reputa-
tion will be costly to preserve. The intermediary will need to constrain
opportunistic counterparties threatening to claim (falsely) that the in-
termediary betrayed their trust. Because no enforceable contracts will
exist to show what the "real" mutual obligations were, rebutting these
kinds of charges will be difficult. 238 If large entities (such as investment
banks) attempt to assume the role of trust intermediaries, the agency
problem may become overwhelming. Monitoring dozens (if not hun-
dreds) of employees who enter into all sorts of tacit understandings
with clients may prove impossible. The offsetting trades will hardly be
risk free as well. If two parties engage in offsetting wash sales, for ex-
ample, the chance that the value of both securities will change by ex-
actly the same amount is diminishingly small. In any other case, one of
237 This type of planning is akin to an exchange of "hostages" that can be used as a
device to overcome opportunism and bounded rationality problems in contracting. See
Williamson, Credible Commitments, supra note 75, at 524, 531. The analogy, however, is
closer not to "hostages" but to "bonds"-a less effective commitment device. A unique
feature of a hostage is that it is valuable to the party giving it, but not to the party re-
ceiving it. See id. at 526-27. Bonds, in contrast, are equally valuable to both sides.
Therefore, bonds are more likely to be expropriated than hostages. See id. If the Wash
Seller "sells" the loss security to the Wash Buyer and the security doubles in value dur-
ing the extended waiting period, the increased value is as attractive to the Wash Buyer
as it is to the Wash Seller.
23 While the agreements need not be unwritten in order to be unenforceable as a
matter of contract law, the government is free to treat any written agreement as en-
forceable for tax purposes if it decides that this is needed to reach the desired level of
deterrence. This may not be necessary, however, because nothing would stop tax
planners from producing competing writings describing their informal agreements.
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the parties will have an incentive to defect, and this incentive may be
239even stronger than in the absence of the offsetting trades.
More generally, only an extreme legal-centric will insist that coop-
eration that is suppressed by a legal regime will necessarily flourish
once the legal constraints are removed. While we can only speculate
about what would happen if the government allows currently prohib-
ited relational tax planning, we know quite a bit about what did hap-
pen when the government allowed formation of generally illegal car-
tels.24 The (perhaps unexpected) answer is that only a few cartels
241formed, and of those that did, many collapsed within a year or two.
This was true even when the government enforced the terms of cartel
agreements! 242 Collusion, as George Stigler emphasized, "is not
free."242 While the specific difficulties inhibiting cartelization surely
differ from those impeding relational tax planning, one of their un-
derlying causes is exactly the same: opportunistic behavior by com-
mercial actors. Granted, Palay's story and the related evidence dis-
cussed above 24 suggest that businesspeople locked into a long-term
relationship can be quite successful regulatory avoiders. Not all
239 This will be the case if one security appreciates while the other declines in
value. A party who "owns" an appreciated security (to be resold at what turns out to be
a below-market price) and has an informal agreement to repurchase a depreciated se-
curity (at what turns out to be an above-market price) will be sorely tempted to defect
on both trades.
240 The Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (2000), and the Export
Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003, 4011-4021, granted antitrust
immunity to U.S. manufacturing exporters. See Dick, Stable Contracts, supra note 174, at
245-48; Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, The Changing International Status of
Export Cartel Exemptions, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 785, 789-90 (2005). The Capper-
Volstead Act of 1922, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291-292, and the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. §§ 671-674, awarded antitrust immunity to agricultural coopera-
tives. See Darren Filson et al., Market Power and Cartel Formation: Theory and an Empirical
Test, 44J.L. & ECON. 465, 466 (2001).
241 See Andrew R. Dick, Identifying Contracts, Combinations and Conspiracies in Re-
straints of Trade, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 203, 206 (1996) [hereinafter Dick,
Restraints of Trade] (reporting that Webb-Pomerene cartels "collectively... accounted
for just 5% of total manufactured exports," even though cartelization varied signifi-
cantly by industry); Dick, Stable Contracts, supra note 174, at 242 ("[N]early one-quarter
of Webb-Pomerene agreements collapsed within 2 years ...."); Filson et al., supra note
240, at 472-73 (reporting that out of 182 possible instances of cartelization, only 39 (or
just over 20%) actually occurred, despite the government's assistance in enforcing the
cartel's terms).
242 Agricultural cartels were government enforced. See Filson et al., supra note 240,
at 466.
243 GeorgeJ. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72J. POL. ECON. 44, 44 (1964).
244 See supra notes 181-191 and accompanying text.
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would-be relational tax planners are so positioned, however. More
importantly, evidence of successful regulatory avoidance proves that it
is possible, not that is it is costless or particularly cheap. Thus, it is far
from certain that counterparty risk in the alternative regime will be a
weaker friction than market risk is today.1
45
Finally, if it is possible to (roughly) reach the desirable level of de-
terrence in the alternative regime, what does this mean for weak co-
operators who are likely to be the largest group of tax planners? They
face the same cost in both regimes, but only as long as they cooperate
in the alternative system. Because this is exactly what they are likely to
do, weak cooperators are indifferent. But the policymakers should
not be. The earlier analysis suggests that the alternative regime has a
clear efficiency advantage.
Because the government does not need to deter relational tax
planning in the alternative regime, the enforcement costs of counter-
party risk do not exceed the enforcement costs of market risk. The
same traditional backstop applies in both cases, leading to similar ex-
penditures on audits, litigation, and rulemaking. It is reasonable to
assume, therefore, that the two enforcement costs are roughly
equal. 246 The same is true of the respective expected tax liabilities. If
so, we can eliminate both components from the relevant equations for
the purposes of comparing market and counterparty risks, yielding
the following simplified summary:
Market Risk Counterparty Risk
Private Cost RBL. RBLc + BC- CG
Social Cost RBLM RBL c
We can now observe that for market and counterparty risks that
have the same social costs (RBLM = RBLc), counterparty risk is a
stronger deterrent if the bargaining cost exceeds the cooperation
gain. For several reasons, this is likely to be the case.
245 An additional imperfection of the alternative regime is that it will impose varying
costs on taxpayers who have different opportunities (and desires) to cooperate. The
same is true in the current system, however. Moreover, the existing market-risk-imposing
rules are similarly imprecise because, for example, they fail to take into account variabil-
ity in riskiness of various assets covered by a single waiting-period provision.
246 The main enforcement cost in the alternative regime will be related to policing
the line between enforceable and unenforceable agreements. Modern contract law
gives us a good idea about the issues involved.
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First, the bargaining cost arises whenever relational tax planning
takes place. As long as bargaining is required, bargaining failures oc-
cur. The cooperation gain, in contrast, exists only in some cases.
When the Taxpayer and the Counterparty have a long-term commer-
cial relationship, reduced transaction costs due to stronger trust may
produce considerable savings for the parties. But if the relationship is
purely social (like the one between the Wash Seller and the Wash
Buyer), or if the two are engaged in a single-shot deal (such as the Ac-
quirer's purchase of the Target from the Seller), the cooperation gain
is zero."' Because no other exchanges occur, there are no transaction
costs to be reduced by enhanced cooperation. Of course, people will
cooperate more in the alternative regime than they currently do, and
they are more likely to become repeat players. Still, as long as not all
relational tax planning takes place as part of extensive business rela-
tionships, the cooperation gain will be small (or zero) in some cases.
Second, the bargaining cost is a direct cost incurred in the rela-
tional tax planning transaction itself. The cooperation gain is a sec-
ond-order benefit that materializes only in the future. Its impact must
be appropriately discounted.
Finally, stronger trust generated by relational tax planning is not a
good in itself (at least from the economic perspective). It is the in-
crease in cooperation and decline in transaction costs that matter.
The cooperation gain would be large if the parties effectively use trust
to reduce transaction costs. Not all relational tax planners will be
equally effective.
In sum, it appears likely that, on average, the net effect of the bar-
gaining cost and the cooperation gain in the alternative regime will be
an additional loss incurred by relational tax planners. This means that
counterparty risk has the same advantage over market risk in the alter-
247 A hard-nosed economist may point out that relational tax planning involving
friends who have no ongoing business relations should lead to stronger personal
friendships (just like it should create stronger business ties for long-term business
partners). The cooperation gain in this case will reflect private and social benefits of a
friendlier society. This may be true, yet I resist this extension because it is much
harder to say anything definitive about the cooperation gain when personal friend-
ships are concerned. The rational analysis of defections in business relationships of-
fered above probably does not apply to friends. A relatively minor betrayal in a rela-
tional tax planning episode may well damage a friendship substantially, or even ruin it
completely. If so, it is ambiguous whether the cooperation gain produced by relational
tax planning among friends is, on balance, a private and social benefit or cost. As on
other occasions when I encounter this type of uncertainty, I assume that the net bene-
fit or cost is roughly zero.
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native regime as business risk has in the existing one. An equally effi-
cient counterparty risk is a stronger deterrent, and an equally deterring
counterparty risk is more efficient. This is yet another advantage of the
alternative regime.
Clearly-and not surprisingly-the choice between the two re-
gimes involves difficult tradeoffs. The point of introducing and con-
sidering the alternative proposal, however, is not to insist on its im-
mediate adoption. Rather, it is to emphasize that a system that is
resistant to relational tax planning is conceivable, has several highly
attractive features, and is not that different from the one we currently
have. In any case, a sweeping reform is not the only alternative to the
status quo. Incremental improvements are considered next.
VI. RATIONALIZING EXISTING RISK-BASED RULES:
INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS
An effort to make modest improvements to the existing rules im-
mediately runs into an additional complication. Under the alternative
approach, most tax planners switch from market risk to counterparty
risk for all their tax planning. Thus, the same people face different
types of risk while planning around the same rules, and only the aggre-
gate effects are considered. As long as this is the case, it is appropriate
to limit the inquiry into the private and social costs of risk bearing to
the factors discussed thus far. Once we decide to revise the existing
rules, however, we must make case-by-case comparisons of different
risks imposed on different taxpayers trying to circumvent different pro-
visions. Elasticity of behavioral responses can no longer be ignored.
To appreciate the importance of taking elasticity into account,
consider the recently promulgated constructive sale and constructive
ownership regimes. The former triggers recognition of taxable gain if
a taxpayer eliminates "substantially all" of her economic exposure to
an appreciated asset.24s The latter forces upon a taxpayer undesirable
tax consequences of owning a hedge fund if the taxpayer enters into a
derivative that mimics "substantially all" of that fund's economics.2
49
Because the economic exposure eliminated in the first case and ac-
quired in the second is tested under the same "substantially all" stan-
dard, the two rules appear to subject taxpayers to similar market risk
and, therefore, give rise to comparable costs.
2 See supra note 26.
249 Id.
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Yet when David Schizer studied these regimes, he discovered that
the similar tests did not translate into similar deterrence. The con-
structive ownership rule created a discontinuous friction. Most tax-
payers stopped entering into constructive ownership transactions, and
only a few restructured their trades to satisfy the new statutory re-
quirement.2 50 The picture was very different with the constructive sale
regime. Here, risk played its typical role of a continuous friction.
Once the rule created adverse tax consequences for those who elimi-
nated "substantially all" of their economic exposure, the markets ad-
justed to deliver hedges that eliminated just a little less than "substan-
tially all" of the underlying economics. 21  The difference in the
resulting frictions means that the two regimes-despite their superfi-
cial similarity-subject tax planners to vastly different costs even
though they appear to impose a very similar amount of risk. Social
costs differ as well because one regime stops most tax planning while
the other one does not.
Alas, Schizer's study remains the only detailed analysis of frictions
produced by risk-based rules. Until we know more about how the
multitude of similar provisions operate in practice, the rational
(though decidedly imperfect) compromise is to assume equal elastic-
ity for all tax planning strategies.
As long as risk-based rules remain calibrated on the assumption
that they impose market risk, and until the numerous statutory refer-
ences to tacit understandings are interpreted and reconciled (or, bet-
ter yet, until the universal relational backstop is added to the Internal
Revenue Code), the government will continue to respond to rela-
tional tax planning on an ex post basis. While the IRS will carry the
burden of identifying this type of planning, the ultimate responsibility
for evaluating it will lie with courts. Judges will continue to interpret
common law doctrines that function as risk-based rules. Therefore,
the following discussion focuses primarily on how these doctrines
should be revised to account for the unique features of various risks.
A. Comparing Market, Business, and Counterparty Risks
Even the admittedly reductionist economic analysis developed in
this Article demonstrates that market, business, and counterparty risks
differ in important respects. Comparing market risk imposed by one
250 Schizer, Frictions, supra note 10, at 1318, 1372-74.
251 Id. at 1318, 1374.
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rule to counterparty (or business) risk resulting from another-even
putting elasticities aside-is very much like comparing apples to or-
anges (or pears). Yet there is little doubt that courts make these com-
parisons all the time, even if implicitly. When a taxpayer engages in
relational tax planning around a clear risk-based rule (as in the
friendly wash sale example), the analysis is easy because two conclu-
sions are clear. First, the private cost of incurring counterparty risk is
lower than the private cost of incurring the corresponding market risk.
If it were not, the taxpayer would simply forgo relational tax planning.
Second, the cost of incurring counterparty risk is too low because the
cost of incurring market risk is set by a clear rule (thirty days, in the
wash sale case).22
If either conclusion is questionable, the analysis becomes much
more difficult. The first conclusion is in doubt when there is no mar-
ket (or business) risk analogue to counterparty risk in a given setting.
Recall the one-year waiting period imposed by Congress to deter
heartless taxpayers from giving appreciated assets to their dying rela-
tives in a hope of receiving them back as a bequest. This scheme has
no arm's length equivalent. Strangers do not leave bequests to
2.53
strangers. In any other case, the risk is different.
The second conclusion cannot be reached when the appropriate
level of market (or business) risk is itself uncertain. For instance, there
is no general rule that a given holding period establishes tax ownership
in the absence of any relational tax planning. 54 When a dealer sells mu-
nicipal bonds to a bank under a repo, we know that an informal under-
255standing between these parties reduces their risk. But what amount
of risk is sufficient without any tacit agreements? If a repo between total
strangers lasts a month, is this long enough to treat the transaction ac-
cording to its form? There is no clear answer to this question. Without
252 For simplicity, I ignore the fact that the wash sale provision allows some formal
hedging.
253 This is because, in any other case, the Counterparty's decision will be affected
by the value of the asset received as a "gift" from the Taxpayer and the temptation to
retain it for personal gain. When the Counterparty is a decedent, this analysis clearly
does not apply.
254 In fact, a variety of waiting periods apply in very similar settings. See supra note
129. For a discussion of the profound uncertainty surrounding the concept of tax
ownership, see Alex Raskolnikov, Contextual Analysis of Tax Ownership, 85 B.U. L. REV.
431 (2005).
255 More precisely, this used to be the case before the repo market became formal-
ized. See STIGUM, supra note 81, at 218-21.
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it, how does one decide whether one month is long enough if the repo
participants are long-term business partners?
256
How do courts and Congress resolve these types of cases? Why is
one year (and not ten) the right waiting period for a heartless rela-
tive? Whatjustified a conclusion that seven to nine months (and not
thirty days) was long enough in the liquidation-reincorporation se-
quence? Putting aside pure guesses and disregarding precedents
(that had to come from somewhere), the only plausible explanation is
that courts and legislators compare different types of risk that arise in
different situations. How these comparisons are made is a mystery of
the legislative process and the miracle of common law. What is im-
portant for our purposes is that they are being made time and again.
If so, the analysis offered in this Article suggests some considera-
tions that would make these comparisons more educated (that is,
157more reflective of real costs and benefits faced by tax planners).
First, when comparing market and business risks (for instance, a wash
sale waiting period with a liquidation-reincorporation holding pe-
riod), courts should be aware of the additional cost imposed by the
latter-the expected business loss (aB x LB). Because business risk is
costlier than market risk, it should be imposed more sparingly. Thus,
assuming courts somehow decided that in light of a thirty-day wait in a
wash sale context the appropriate waiting period under the liquida-
tion-reincorporation test is seven to nine months, they should reduce
that waiting period (say, to five to seven months) to take account of
the expected business loss.
25 8
256 To take a business risk example, consider the special provision designed to de-
ter drop-and-sell schemes. If an owner selling her business incorporates it having al-
ready reached an informal agreement to sell the newly received stock, the risk is lower
than if no such agreement exists. It is unclear, however, how long an owner must hold
the unwanted stock without any implicit understandings about the stock's future sale
in order to satisfy the requirement that she control the corporation "immediately after
the exchange." I.R.C. § 351(a) (2000).
257 Admittedly, since it is unclear how courts and policymakers make these com-
parisons today, one can never rule out a possibility that their decisions already reflect
the analysis offered below.
258 In fact, judges may even take into account the magnitude of the expected busi-
ness loss. It may be reasonable to conclude, for instance, that this loss is relatively high
when a taxpayer must close her business and later restart it anew, lower when she must
operate the business without limited liability (both scenarios are possible in the liqui-
dation-reincorporation case), and lower still when she must continue to own the busi-
ness in an incorporated form for some time (the drop-and-sell scenario). The sub-
stance-over-form and step transaction doctrines are clearly broad enough to allow
these types of inquiries.
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Second, when comparing market risk to counterparty risk in-
curred in a one-off business transaction (such as the Seller's sale of
the Target to the Acquirer), courts should change nothing in their
current approach. This is so because counterparty risk may be a
stronger or weaker deterrent than market risk in this setting. The co-
operation gain here is zero, while the bargaining cost is positive, sug-
gesting that counterparty risk gives rise to a relatively larger private
cost than market risk. On the other hand, the expected tax liability is
smaller for counterparty risk (the likelihood of detection, and, there-
fore, ac, is very low for relational tax planners today), making it a
weaker deterrent. Because it is unclear which of these effects pre-
dominates, there is no compelling reason to disturb the existing doc-
trine.
B. Evaluating Counterparty Risk in Different Settings
Many cases of relational tax planning, however, do not involve
one-shot deals between strangers. Exchanges among friends, relatives,
and long-term business partners clearly involve less risk. Courts al-
ready take this into account. This is entirely appropriate because
lower risk means lower risk-bearing loss and smaller "price" for captur-
ing the desired tax benefit. What the current doctrinal approach
lacks is a recognition that the extent of commercial relationships
should be considered beyond the evaluation of the level of trust (and,
therefore, risk) among relational tax planners. This makes the cur-
rent law insufficiently nuanced but may be easily remedied.
Several fairly uncontroversial assumptions must be made before
proceeding to concrete recommendations. First, it is reasonable to
posit that the cooperation gain reflects only a reduction of transaction
260costs and not a change in the relationship's scope . Second, the ex-
259 See, e.g., Kornfeld v. Comm'r, 137 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 1998) ("[Where]
the parties to the transactions in question are related, the level of skepticism as to the
form of the transaction is heightened, because of the greater potential for complicity
between related parties in arranging their affairs in a manner devoid of legitimate mo-
tivations." (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gordon v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.
309, 325-26 (1985))).
260 This is not always true. For instance, as Lisa Bernstein and Barak Richman ex-
plain, the diamond trade is impossible without a high level of trust between the trad-
ers. See Lisa Berustein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Barak D. Richman, How Community
Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 383 (2006). In this kind of environment, an increase in the cooperation
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tent of informal relational contracting can be inferred from the size of
formal interactions. Third, it is unrealistic to expect that courts can
determine the social value of the cooperation gain on a case-by-case
basis at a reasonable cost.262 Therefore, courts should ignore it alto-
gether. Finally, it is useful to compare situations where the only differ-
ence is the cost of incurring counterparty risk. For instance, assume
that the tax planning in question always involves a Taxpayer hoping to
capture a tax benefit of the same size by owning an asset she does not
want to own (or not owning an asset she wants to own) for a period of
263time. Marginal deterrence considerations suggest that in this case
we would want all Taxpayers to bear the same cost regardless of the
nature of their relationships with Counterparties. 64
gain may produce a discontinuous change from almost no contracting to an extensive
relationship.
261 This is probably a conservative assumption. As transactors develop trust, the
share of informal contracting tends to rise. See, e.g., Bensaou & Anderson, supra note
160, at 475 (finding that more multifaceted, intense, and eventful buyer-supplier rela-
tionships produce larger relation-specific investments indicative of stronger trust).
Therefore, the more extensive the relationship, the less formal it is likely to be.
262 The parties have no incentive to reveal information about their additional rela-
tional tax planning because this information would tend to suggest that the coopera-
tion gain is a social cost and courts should be particularly unforgiving. At the same
time, self-serving evidence of non-tax-motivated informal contracting will be highly un-
reliable. The evidence will be self-serving because it will tend to show that relational
tax planning facilitates socially valuable commercial exchanges, suggesting leniency
from a court. Unlike in contract disputes, where one of the parties has an incentive to
demonstrate the course of dealing or the course of performance while the other pa.,ty
has an incentive to dispute this showing, neither the Taxpayer nor the Counterparty
will have a reason to assist the IRS in questioning the evidence of socially valuable non-
tax-driven relational contracting that is certain to be produced by the Taxpayer in or-
der to argue that the cooperation gain is positive for the society as a whole.
263 Even this fairly narrow description covers wash sales, dividends-received deduc-
tion and foreign tax credit schemes, norm-based and bilateral repos, see supra notes 71
and 82, the heartless relative example, see supra text accompanying note 222, the Par-
ent/Children example, see supra text accompanying note 223, the drop-and-sell situa-
tion, see supra text accompanying note 52, some liquidation-reincorporation cases, see
supra text accompanying note 54, and many other situations. See, e.g., United States v.
Cumberland Pub. Serv., 338 U.S. 451 (1950); Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S.
331 (1945); Walker v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1976); Steel Improvement &
Forge Co. v. Comm'r, 314 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963).
264 The basic insight is that if there are ten alternative relational tax planning
strategies, and if taxpayers will receive tax benefits of equal value by pursing any one,
they are indifferent about which strategy to follow as long as the costs are the same. If,
however, pursuing any of the nine strategies costs 10 (dollars or utility units) while fol-
lowing the tenth one costs only 2, the effectiveness of 90% of the rules designed to de-
ter relational tax planning is undermined because taxpayers will simply reduce their
taxes by following the tenth strategy. (Eventually their marginal cost may rise to the
level of following the other nine, but by then a lot of tax planning will have occurred.)
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Once these assumptions are accepted, conclusions readily follow.
"Thicker" commercial relationships have lower bargaining costs and
larger cooperation gains than "thinner" ones. 65 Bargaining costs are
lower because the very existence of an extensive relationship reveals
266
that the parties have learned to overcome bargaining problems.
Cooperation gains are larger because the more contracting takes
267
place, the larger the transaction cost savings. At the same time, the
expected tax liability is smaller for thicker relationships. This is so be-
cause enforcement is particularly difficult when parties have many
ways of compensating each other indirectly for the mutual "favors"
conferred in relational tax planning episodes (i.e., Pc is relatively
small). In a thin relationship, a resale of a loss security on nonmarket
terms, to take one example, is much more obvious (fl, is relatively
large). This analysis suggests that relational tax planning has a lower
private cost when it accompanies thicker relationships compared to
thinner ones. At the same time, its social cost is likely to be higher for
thicker relationships due to larger enforcement costs.
Courts are already more suspicious of tax benefits arising from re-
lationships that have higher levels of trust, and they appear to recog-
nize that more extensive business interactions (like the one between
the Liquidator and the 21-Holder) correspond to stronger trust.
2
1
8
The same is true of stronger friendships, however (such as the one be-
For a fuller discussion of marginal deterrence in tax administration, see Alex Raskol-
nikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 609-12 (2006).
265 A relationship is "thick" if it is multifaceted, intensive, and potentially long last-
ing. For a similar use of the term, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition
and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 251 (1995).
266 See, e.g., Bensaou & Anderson, supra note 160, at 475.
267 It is worth noting that at some point the cooperation gain will start declining as
the relationship becomes thicker. An assumption that marginal returns to trust de-
cline as the trust grows appears plausible. If the Taxpayer already trusts the Counter-
party "like a brother," there is not much room for improvement. Few commercial par-
ties, however, are likely to approach this level of trust.
26 Opinions routinely emphasize that a particular counterparty is a taxpayer's
long-term customer, employee, and so on. See, e.g., Granite Trust Co. v. United States,
238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956) (taxable liquidation case, 21-Holder is the Liquidator's
long-term customer); Comm'r v. Day & Zimmermann, 151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945)
(taxable liquidation case, 21-Holder is the treasurer of the Liquidator); Citizens Nat'l
Bank of Waco v. United States, 551 F.2d 832 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (isolated repo case, the
Counterparty is a long-term bank of the Taxpayer).
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tween the Wash Seller and the Wash Buyer). Yet the two types of
cases are different. Only the parties to a thick commercial relation-
ship are relatively unaffected by the bargaining problems. Only for
them is the cost of tax planning reduced by a considerable coopera-
tion gain. Relational tax planning is cheaper for these taxpayers than
it is for social friends. It is also more socially costly. Therefore, courts
should scrutinize counterparty risk incurred by parties who belong to
270thick commercial relationships even more than they do today.
The analysis of multilateral risk cases is very similar. Even fewer
assumptions are required here. We no longer need to infer the mag-
nitude of informal cooperation from the extent of formal contracting.
Norms are by definition informal.
The thicker the norm environment, the larger the cooperation
gain.71 More norms mean more informal transacting that can benefit
from reduced transaction costs. The bargaining cost of incurring
multilateral risk is small in any case: not much bargaining is needed
when the parties follow a norm. As with thicker dyadic interactions,
thicker norm environments produce smaller expected tax liabilities.
Thus-with an important caveat discussed below-courts should be
most demanding when they consider relational tax planning among
contractors who belong to a thick norm environment. Similar analysis
suggests that a thin norm-based exchange should be scrutinized more
than a thick bilateral relationship.
72
269 See, e.g., Stein v. Comm'r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 992 (1977) (friendly wash sale case,
the Counterparty is a Taxpayer's friend, but the two have no ongoing commercial rela-
tionship).
270 For example, assume that it is sufficient for the Taxpayer to part with (or hold)
the asset under an informal agreement with an occasional business partner for two
months. If the same transactors have extensive commercial dealings, the waiting pe-
riod should be longer (say, three months). Obviously, the numbers are used just to
illustrate the progression. Taking a more general approach relying on the current step
transaction doctrine, assume that the one-off deal is scrutinized under the doctrine's
least far-reaching binding commitment version. A more expansive interdependence
test should then apply to a thick relationship. See Comm'r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96
(1968) (establishing the binding commitment test); McDonald's Rests. of Ill., Inc. v.
Comm'r, 688 F.2d 520, 524-25 (7th Cir. 1982) (enunciating the interdependence test).
Note that this conclusion is independent of the level of trust between relational tax
planners. While thick relationships usually correspond to high trust, an occasional
business deal between long-term friends may also take place in a high-trust setting.
The former should be scrutinized more for the reasons discussed in the text.
271 A norm environment is "thick" if its members follow many different norms in
their interactions with each other.
272 The cooperation gain may be larger in a thick bilateral relationship (when par-
ties follow only one or two norms in a thin norm environment, enhanced trust can
2008] 1259
1260 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:1181
One caveat to this analysis must be made to take account of wel-
fare-maximizing norms. The earlier discussion of multilateral risk
concluded that it is difficult to decide in the abstract whether the gen-
eral externality is socially positive or negative. When judges consider
individual cases, however, more can be done. Litigants cannot make
up socially valuable tax-neutral norms just to support their tax posi-
273tlons. If they manage to present convincing evidence of a thick en-
vironment involving many norms that produce no apparent tax sav-
ings, courts should be somewhat more lenient than otherwise.
Granted, taxpayers will hide tax-driven norms from the court. Still,
the mere presence of many tax-neutral norms will suggest that the
general externality is positive, making the tax planning in question
relatively less costly for society. At the same time, if taxpayers relying
on a tax-reducing norm are unable to describe any tax-neutral norms
that exist among the same transactors, a court could reasonably infer
that the general externality is small or negative. If so, the previous
conclusions about stronger scrutiny of norm-based relational tax
planning apply.
Comparisons between dyadic and norm-based interactions are
useful only if courts can distinguish between the two at a reasonable
cost. In some cases, they should be able to do so rather easily. First,
the government may know about widespread tax-driven norms even
before it initiates litigation. In fact, this knowledge may be the reason
why the government decides to litigate in the first place. The recent
wave of tax shelter controversies comes to mind. The unstated custom
of assuming that tax shelter clients have a business purpose for enter-
smooth only a few interactions), and the bargaining cost is probably low in both set-
tings. Yet the key difference is in the amount of risk. Sanctions for defection in a
norm environment are stronger because a failure to follow a norm will be punished
not only by the offended party, but by many other members of the group as well. This
isk-reducing effect of norms almost certainly overshadows the difference in the coop-
eration gain. Continuing with our example, the holding period for a Taxpayer who
follows a well-established but isolated norm should be, say, four months (that is, longer
than the three months required for an extensive dyadic relationship). If the norm en-
vironment is thick, only holding the asset for half a year should be enough to capture
the tax benefit. More broadly, the most far-reaching end result version of the step
transaction doctrine should apply to norm-based exchanges. See McDonald's Rests., 688
F.2d at 524 (explaining the end result test).
273 Evidence of socially valuable norms is much less falsifiable than evidence of
non-tax-motivated relational contracting because a court may demand independent
verification of the existence of norms.
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ing into questionable mass-marketed schemes is well known to the
274 175IRS. The agency is making the courts aware of this as well.
Second, the market practice may be so established that a basic in-
quiry into the structure of the taxpayer's business would readily reveal
it. The fixed-price repurchase norm that prevailed in repo markets
for decades is a good example. Not only were courts aware of it, but
276the opinions described the practice in considerable detail.
Finally, courts themselves are quite capable of identifying some
business norms at a very low additional cost. All it takes is to keep
their possible existence in mind while judges analyze relevant prece-
dents. The apparent informal understanding among wealthy benefac-
tors and charitable organizations could be readily discovered in this
fashion. When case after case describes how donors rely on charities
to do what would be desirable for the donors, and charities end up
following the donors' wishes time after time without being formally
obligated to do so, a reasonable inference arises that the parties know
how to dance this dance before the music starts playing. The norm
reveals itself.
No doubt, these techniques will not identify all settings that in-
volve multilateral risk. But they will surely expose a few, and where
they do, courts should recognize the type of risk involved. More gen-
erally, I am not making a naive suggestion that courts should attempt
precise evaluations of the thickness of a dyadic relationship or a given
norm environment, the social value of tax-neutral norms, and the like.
But it is clearly a mistake to ignore these considerations. Courts (and
the IRS) already distinguish between high- and low-trust interactions.
They are already aware of certain environments where norms are wide-
spread. They already compare (even if implicitly) different types of
risk imposed by different statutory provisions. Taking account of
whether tax planners have a personal or business relationship,
274 See, e.g., James M. Peaslee, Circular 230: Make Room for Informal Written Advice,
106 TAx NOTES 1457, 1457 (2005) (referring, in a letter to the IRS, to "some practitio-
ners [who write] low-grade, canned tax opinions" that "assume a business purpose or
profit motive where none exists"). The government has certainly taken notice. See,
e.g., Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(ii) (2007) ("[l]t is unreasonable [for a tax
practitioner giving an opinion] to assume that a transaction has a business purpose.").
275 See, e.g., Long Term Capital Holdings, LP v. United States, 150 F. App'x. 40, 42-
43 (2d Cir. 2005).
276 See, e.g., First Am. Nat'l Bank of Nashville v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098 (6th
Cir. 1972); Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Memphis v. United States, 426 F.2d 115 (6th
Cir. 1970); Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. United States, 421 F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1970);
Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. United States, 573 F.2d 1201, 1205 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
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whether the business relationship is extensive, and whether tax plan-
ning relies on social norms is not only possible but is fairly easy to do
in many cases. Using this additional information along the lines sug-
gested here will make the current law more rational and will improve
marginal deterrence.
CONCLUSION
This Article highlights the problem of relational tax planning and
offers a more sophisticated understanding of various risks. The result-
ing insights lead to a range of proposals-from a sweeping (and coun-
terintuitive) reform to a series of incremental improvements. All pro-
posed solutions have costs as well as benefits; all involve tradeoffs.
Moreover, relational tax planning is surrounded by pervasive uncer-
tainty. The magnitude of the cooperation gain and bargaining cost,
the cooperation gain's social value, the robustness of the alternative
counterparty-risk-imposing regime, and other critical issues are
unlikely to be ever resolved with absolute confidence.
This uncertainty, however, should not obscure the conclusions
that are anything but tentative. Relational tax planning is a serious
problem. Market, business, and counterparty risks have different pri-
vate and social costs. Some of these differences-such as the business
risk's superiority over market risk and the diminishing cost of incur-
ring counterparty risk for thicker dyadic relationships and norm-based
exchanges-are quite clear. A regime where risk-based rules impose
primarily counterparty risk is possible and, in fact, not that different
from the existing one. In many cases, adjusting the current judicial
doctrines to take account of the unique features of business and coun-
terparty risks is neither conceptually difficult nor prohibitively costly.
We have more than enough information to make intelligent judg-
ments about possible reforms.
Perhaps this Article will convince policyrnakers to embrace the
sweeping overhaul of the current risk-based rules. Or they may do just
the opposite and tighten the existing doctrines along the lines of the
incremental reform proposals. Whatever the case, recognition of rela-
tional tax planning as a unique and complex phenomenon-and nu-
anced analysis of its distinctive features-are critical in assuring that
any revision of risk-based rules is based on more than simplistic argu-
ments and outdated intuitions. Relational tax planning has been ig-
nored for too long. It is time to give it serious consideration.
